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CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM: JUGGLING
BETWEEN POLITICS AND PERFECTION
PA TRICK JOHNSTON*
In this Article, Professor Johnston analyzes the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
and its requirement that every United States District Court direct substantial re-
sources toward reducing delay in the courts. He discusses the Civil Justice Re-
form Act in the context of a tradition of reform efforts directed at reducing delay
and considers how it shapes our understanding of delay and ultimately, proce-
dural justice. Professor Johnston questions the utility of using the speed of case
processing as a gauge of procedural justice, and criticizes the limited model of
procedural justice promoted by the Act and other similar efforts of delay reduc-
tion. Professor Johnston concludes that such reform efforts are dangerous be-
cause of their effect of narrowing our concerns for and understanding of
procedural justice.
"For who would bear... the law's delay ... 
Hamlet Prince of Denmark, Act III, scene I
INTRODUCTION
f-HAT is "procedural justice"' and what methods best achieve it?
VVAsMirjan Damaska has suggested, such questions comprise part
of an "immense and bewildering subject," the investigation of which can
make us "uncertain about the adequacy of our basic points of refer-
ence."2 Although discussions of procedural justice have not engendered
* Assistant Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; J.D., University
of Chicago School of Law 1980. The author served as the Reporter for the Advisory
Group appointed by the United States District Court for Delaware pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990. Nevertheless, the opinions stated in this article are solely
those of the author. I would like to thank Professors Alan Garfield, Charles Geyh, Rob-
ert Hayman, Mary Brigid McManamon, and Carl Tobias for their comments on this
article. I also would like to thank Jennifer Mayo and Paul Padien, Widener University
School of Law Class of 1995, and Craig Hoogstraten, Widener University School of Law
Class of 1994, for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. Discussions about dispute resolution or adjudication often distinguish between
the justice of procedural laws and the justice of substantive laws. Traditionally, substan-
tive law defines rights, duties or powers of people and institutions with respect to one
another. The law of contracts or torts would be an example of substantive law. Proce-
dural law, on the other hand, governs the processes for resolving a dispute about substan-
tive law rights or duties. A rule prescribing how parties disputing substantive law rights
should present their claims to a court would be an example of a procedural law. For
general discussions of the distinctions made between substance and procedure, see, e.g.,
Michael D. Bayles, Procedural Justice: Allocating to Individuals 3-4 (1990); Fleming
James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure 1-3 (4th ed. 1992); Richard L. Marcus et al., Civil
Procedure: A Modern Approach 1 (1989). While I avoid providing a comprehensive
definition of "justice" in this article, I will use the term "procedural justice" broadly to
suggest an assessment of the quality or success of procedural law in providing dispute-
resolution participants what we think they are due.
2. Miran R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process 1 (1986).
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a consensus on definitions or approaches,3 certain notions about proce-
dural justice seem to persist. One such belief is that the amount of time
procedures take to provide substantive justice affects our perception of
the quality of justice. Few would fail to recognize the adage "Justice
delayed is justice denied."4 Our fascination with the amount of time it
takes courts to resolve disputes extends across centuries-at least from
the Magna Carta5 through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Con-
cern with the problems of delay also extends beyond Anglo-American
jurisprudence.7 Indeed, perpetual worry over "justice delayed" might be
viewed as the fate of humanity rather than a chosen tradition.'
3. For some recent examples of varied approaches in discussing "procedural jus-
tice," see, e.g., Robert M. Cover & Owen M. Fiss, The Structure of Procedure 2-46
(1979) (providing edited readings which address various values assigned to procedural
law); Damaska, supra note 2 (providing a conceptual framework for understanding dispa-
rate mechanisms of legal procedure based on the organization of procedural authority
and the functions of government); E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology
of Procedural Justice (1988) (presenting a social psychology study of procedural justice);
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 85-86 (1971) (distinguishing between "pure," "perfect,"
and "imperfect" procedural justice).
4. This often quoted phrase has been attributed to William Ewart Gladstone, the
Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1868-1874. See Laurence J. Peter, Peter's Quota-
tions 276 (1977).
5. "The fortieth clause [of the Magna Carta] provides that right and justice shall not
be sold or denied or delayed." 1 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 57-58
(7th ed. 1956).
6. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 has provided, in part, since 1938: "They [the
rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). Effective December 1, 1993, Rule 1 pro-
vides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be "construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." 146 F.R.D. 405
(emphasis added). The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 1, as amended, describe the
purpose of the amendment as ensuring "that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but
also without undue cost and delay." 146 F.R.D. 535.
7. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective 243
(1989) ("[T]he problem of delay in court is one which plagues many countries ....");
World Association of Judges/International Legal Center, Court Congestion (1971) (pa-
pers of a workshop held in Venice from November 12 to November 15, 1970 to discuss
congestion and delay in the administration of justice and suggest remedial approaches to
the problem). The problem of delay apparently has also plagued ecclesiastical courts.
See Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in
The Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion 29, 30 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965) (re-
porting a 1965 New York Times headline which referred to Pope Paul exhorting the
matrimonial courts of the Roman Catholic church to reduce delay).
8. See, e.g., Jane W. Adler et al., The Pace of Litigation: Conference Proceedings, at
iii (1982) ("[The professional literature indicates dissatisfaction with the pace of legal
proceedings in all civilizations that have left written records .... "); Thomas W. Church,
Jr. et al., Pretrial Delay: A Review and Bibliography, at ix (1978) ("Delayed disposition
of cases is a critical problem facing the nation's trial courts. It regularly receives adverse
attention from the press and criticism from the public."); Jefferson B. Fordham, Foreword
to A. Leo Levin & Edward A. Woolley, Dispatch and Delay: A Field Study of Judicial
Administration in Pennsylvania, at iii (1961) ("Time marches on and many changes come
about, but the law's delay, like the common cold, abides with us."); Richard S. Miller, A
Program for the Elimination of the Hardships of Litigation Delay, 27 Ohio St. L.J. 402,
402 (1966) ("Like the weather it [litigation delay] is a common topic of conversation, at
least among judges and lawyers."); George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Con-
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One recent manifestation of the delay legacy is the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990 ("CJRA" or "Act").9 The CJRA has made delay more
than a matter of historical or philosophical interest for the ninety-four
United States district courts. The Act forces each district court to em-
brace delay anxiety as well as ponder corrective therapies. Because of the
CJRA, United States district courts will be engaged until 199710 in a
continuous self-examination for the delay which the Act assumes gener-
ally infects civil dispute resolution processes."' The CJRA does not spe-
cifically define the delay which it seeks to have district courts abate, nor
does it explicitly prescribe a particular therapy for all courts where delay
is found. Nevertheless, the Act presents the reduction of delay as a mat-
ter of paramount importance.
Both proponents and opponents of the CJRA have suggested that it
is-in whole or in part-revolutionary.' 2 Whether or not the CJRA rises
gestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 527, 527 (1989) ("Litigation delay has proven a cease-
less and unremitting problem of modem civil justice.").
9. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 comprises Title I of the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105, 104 Stat. 5089-98 (1990) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992)).
10. The CJRA expires on December 1, 1997. See § 103(a), 104 Stat. at 5096. The
Act will not bind district courts after that date.
11. For a discussion of the particular requirements of the CJRA, see infra text accom-
panying notes 18-8 1. For a discussion of the assumption of delay underlying the CJRA,
see infra text accompanying notes 155-271.
12. See Report of the Advisory Group for the United States District Court of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Appointed Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
at 1 (1991) ("The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is the most significant piece of legisla-
tion that the Congress has enacted in the last three decades directed to procedures of the
federal courts for reducing cost and delay in civil litigation."); Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Equal, Accessible. Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1
Comell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 4 (1992) ("[T]he [Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990] imple-
ments, for the first time, a national strategy to attack the problems of cost and delay in
civil litigation."); Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26
U.S.F. L. Rev. 445, 490 (1992) ("The CJRA... will overhaul unnecessarily the infra-
structure of the civil litigation process."); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in
Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375, 377 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-
Reformation] ("The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is fomenting a nationwide proce-
dural revolution that is probably unparalleled since the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938."); Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United'" The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 105 (1991) ("The CIRA promises to have a
profound impact on the practice of civil litigation in the federal court system."). For
other articles addressing the Civil Justice Reform Act, see Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kath-
leen L. Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A Question of Parity With Our Interna-
tional Rivals, 13 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 1 (1992); R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting
Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 687
(1993); Mary Brigid McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-all
or a Placebo? An Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 Rev. Litig. 329
(1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act
and Separation of Powers, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 1283 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unconsti-
tutional Rulemaking]; Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern
District of Texas: Creating and Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 Rev. Litig. 165 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Civil Justice
Reform]; Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Ohio St. J. on
1994]
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to the level of a revolution, it does impose new and substantial burdens
on the federal courts and their resources.' 3 Accordingly, we should ex-
amine whether delay deserves the attention which the CJRA mandates.
Certainly the term "delay" carries with it a sense of contamination of
optimal processes, and it is not a concept normally associated with jus-
tice. 14 Consequently, the goal of eliminating delay initially may seem
neither exceptional nor unwarranted. However, if legislation reduces the
number of lenses through which we view the quality of justice, then, in
effect, it promotes a particular understanding of procedural justice. Leg-
islation such as the CJRA, therefore, may be viewed as a political 5
choice as to what "procedural justice" shall mean in the federal courts.
While I do not intend to promote the perversity of delay here, I do
hope to shed light on the effects of the "emerging resolve to eliminate
delay,"" as exemplified by the CJRA. In this Article, I consider how the
CRA "revolution" shapes our understanding of delay and, ultimately,
procedural justice. 7 In Part I, I provide a brief primer on the CJRA,
describing the Act and its genesis. An understanding of the CJRA's
terms and its legislative history is necessary to appreciate the extent of
the resources which the Act dedicates to the delay issue and the emphasis
which the Act places on delay. In addition, the explanation of the Act in
Part I suggests how the CJRA limits the focus of federal courts and in-
duces anxiety about being "fast enough." In Part II, I explain how the
CJRA fails to define adequately the task it has given to the district
courts, and I analyze how those courts might understand the scope of
Disp. Resol. 115 (1991); William K. Slate II, Early Implementation Districts: Pioneers
and a Plethora of New Local Rules, 11 Rev. Litig. 367 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice
Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 89 (1993); Carl Tobias, Essay,
Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act, 30 Harv. J. Legis. 115 (1993) [hereinafter
Tobias, Recalibrating]; Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal
Civil Procedure, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1393 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
and the Balkanization].
13. For a description of the obligations imposed by the Act, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 37-80.
14. For example, Black's Law Dictionary defines "delay" to mean: "To retard; ob-
struct; put off; postpone; defer; procrastinate; prolong the time of or before; hinder; inter-
pose obstacles; as when it is said that a conveyance was made to 'hinder and delay
creditors.'" Black's Law Dictionary 425 (6th ed. 1990). See also Mary L. Luskin, Build-
ing a Theory of Case Processing Time, 62 Judicature 115, 116 (1978) (noting that delay
usually indicates abnormal or unacceptable time lapse).
15. I use the term "political" to refer to competition between competing interests for
priority or leadership. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 883 (1981). Cf Mul-
lenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 12, at 1338 (criticizing the CJRA as a
"highly political" piece of legislation and a cynical attempt by Congress to wrest proce-
dural rulemaking authority from the judiciary).
16. Larry L. Sipes, Reducing Delay in State Courts: A March Against Folly, 37
Rutgers L. Rev. 299, 317 (1985).
17. For other articles addressing the CJRA's impact on procedural justice, see Mul-
lenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 382 (describing the Act as one dimension of
a political agenda which seeks to impose a certain vision of procedural justice at the
federal level); Robel, supra note 12, at 128-31 (suggesting the CJRA fosters a corporate
political agenda).
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their job of delay reduction. Part H considers not only the CJRA but
also the language, activities, and assumptions of advocates of delay re-
form in general. Finally, in Part III, I criticize the limited model of pro-
cedural justice promoted by the CJRA and similar efforts of delay
reduction proponents. I question the utility of using the speed of case
processing as a gauge of procedural justice, and I conclude that efforts at
delay reduction such as the CJRA mask the broad range of concerns
covered by the term "justice." In short, instead of fostering positive re-
form, the approach championed by the CJRA may diminish the opportu-
nity of approximating justice through the federal courts.
I. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT AND ITS GENESIS
The CJRA followed, in large part, from the work of a task force
("Brookings task force") convened by the Brookings Institution"8 and
the Foundation for Change19 at the request of Senator Joseph Biden.Y°
In 1988, Senator Biden prompted the Brookings task force to "develop a
set of recommendations to alleviate the problems of excessive cost and
delay" 21 in civil litigation. The membership of the task force was se-
18. The Brookings Institution has described itself as "an independent organization
devoted to nonpartisan research, education and publication in economics, government,
foreign policy, and the social sciences generally. Its principal purposes are to aid in the
development of sound public policies and to promote public understanding of issues of
national importance." Justice for All: Reducing Cost and Delay in Civil Litigation, Re-
port of a Task Force, at v (1989) [hereinafter Justice for All].
19. The Foundation for Change has described itself as "a nonprofit corporation or-
ganized to foster, promote and directly participate in research, study and educational
programs on a variety of complex public policy issues. The Foundation's objective is to
involve itself in complicated issues where there is a need for experts to study and consider
various policy options." Foundation for Change Civil Litigation Project: Procedural Re-
form of the Civil Justice System, A Study Conducted by Louis Harris and Associates 12,
reprinted in Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Re-
form Act7 Hearings on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before the Subcomm. on Courts Intel-
lectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 511 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings]. Mark Gitenstein, the
Executive Director of the Foundation for Change and a co-reporter for the Brookings
task force, had served as Chief Counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the United States
Senate. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii, 45.
20. See S. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 13 (1990) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
416], reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6816; H.R. Rep. No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1990) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 732], reprinted in House Hearings, supra note
19, at 292; Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii; Biden, supra note 12, at 4. S. Rep. No.
416 accompanied S. 2648, an amendment in the nature of a substitute for S. 2027 (the
first version of the CJRA), as approved and reported by the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on July 12, 1990. See infra note 35 (describing the Act's legislative history).
H.R. Rep. No. 732 accompanied H.R. 3898, as amended and approved by the House on
September 18, 1990. See House Hearings, supra note 19, at 285. Senator Biden (D. Del.),
the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, also served as the Honorary Chairman of
the Foundation for Change. See id. at 511.
21. Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii. The task force published its findings and
recommendations in Justice for All, supra note 18 [hereinafter "the Brookings report"].
The task force focused only on problems with the federal civil justice system, and primar-
ily the civil justice system in district courts. See id at vii.
1994]
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lected to provide a broad spectrum of authorities representing the com-
peting interests in the civil justice system.22 The task force consisted of
litigators from the plaintiffs' and defense bars, civil rights lawyers, repre-
sentatives of the insurance industry, general counsel of corporations, rep-
resentatives of environmental and consumer organizations, former
judges, law professors, and social scientists. 23 The task force agreed to
submit only those recommendations on which all its members agreed. In
22. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 13.
23. The membership of the Brookings task force included: Debra Ballen, Vice Presi-
dent for Policy Development and Research at the American Insurance Association in
Washington, D.C.; Robert Banks, Counsel to Latham & Watkins in New York, N.Y. and
formerly General Counsel of the Xerox Corporation; Robert G. Begam, a former Presi-
dent of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Gideon Cashman, a senior partner
at Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn in New York; Alfred W. Cortese, a partner at
Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C.; Susan Getzendanner, a partner at Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom in Chicago and a former United States District Court judge;
Mark Gitenstein, see supra note 19; Barry Goldstein, Director of the Washington office of
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund; Jamie Gorelick, a partner at Miller,
Cassidy, Larrocca & Lewin in Washington, D.C.; Marcia D. Greenberger, the Managing
Attorney of the National Women's Law Center in Washington, D.C.; Patrick Head, Vice
President and General Counsel of the FMC Corporation; Deborah Hensler, Director of
Research at the Institute for Civil Justice, Rand Corporation; W. Michael House, a part-
ner at Shaw, Pitman, Potts & Trowbridge in Washington, D.C.; Shirley Hufstedler, a
partner at Hufstedler, Miller, Kaus & Beardsley in Los Angeles and a former judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Kenneth Kay, a partner at
Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C.; Gene Kimmelman, the Legis-
lative Director of the Consumer Federation of America; Norman Krivosha, Executive
Vice President-Administration and General Counsel for Ameritas Financial Services of
Lincoln, Nebraska; Leo Levin, Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School and a former Director of the Federal Judicial Center; Carl D. Lig-
gio, General Counsel of Ernst & Young in New York and formerly Chairman of the
Board of the American Corporate Counsel Association; Robert E. Litan, a Senior Fellow
and Director of the Center for Economic Progress within the Economic Studies Program
at the Brookings Institution; Frank McFadden, the Senior Vice President and General
Counsel of Blount, Inc. and a former Chief Judge of the United States District Court for
the District of Alabama; Francis McGovern, a Professor of Law at the School of Public
Health, University of Alabama at Birmingham; Stephen B. Middlebrook, the Senior Vice
President and General Counsel at Aetna Life & Casualty; Edward Muller, Vice Presi-
dent, General Counsel, and Chief Administrative Officer of Whittaker Corporation; Rob-
ert M. Osgood, a partner in the London office of Sullivan & Cromwell; Alan Parker,
Deputy Executive Director of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America; Richard
Paul, Vice President and General Counsel of Xerox Corporation; Judyth Pendell, Assis-
tant Vice President of Law and Public Affairs at Aetna Life & Casualty; John A. Pender-
grass, Senior Attorney in Research & Policy Analysis Division of the Environmental Law
Institute; George Priest, Professor of Law and Economics at the Yale Law School;
Charles E. Renfrew, Director and Vice President-Law of the Chevron Corporation and
formerly a United States district court judge for the Northern District of California;
Tony Roisman, of counsel to Cohen, Milstein & Hausfeld and former director of Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice; John F. Schmutz, Senior Vice President and General Counsel
for E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company; Christopher Schroeder, Professor of Law at
the Duke University Law School; Bill Wagner, the President of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America; and Diane Wood, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago Law School. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 45-49. The
Brookings report also identifies other individuals who provided assistance to the task
force during its deliberations. See id. at 49.
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effect, each of the thirty-six members of the task force had the authority
to veto any proposed recommendation.24
Despite the diverse backgrounds of the task force's membership, its
voting procedures, and the hopes of Senator Biden, it is not certain that
the task force's recommendations reflect a consensus among all those in-
terested in the process of civil litigation. Scholars of the CJRA have crit-
icized the task force membership as being unduly weighted towards
corporate and insurance industry interests and for failing to include any
active judicial officers.2"
After discussing and debating reform proposals over a nine month pe-
riod,26 the Brookings task force produced a lengthy set of recommenda-
tions for reducing costs and delays in federal civil litigation." The
recommendations addressed three broad aspects of federal civil litigation:
procedure,2" judicial resources,2 9 and the activities of attorneys and cli-
ents that affect cost and delay.30 The majority of the recommendations
concerned changes in procedure, i.e., steps that courts and judges could
take to reduce cost and delay in civil litigation.3 Through its recommen-
dations for procedural reform, the Brookings task force hoped to provide
participants in the civil justice system with the "proper incentives" to
minimize cost and delay.32
Less than six months after the Brookings task force issued its report,
Senator Biden introduced his initial version of the CJRA in the Senate on
January 25, 1990.33 Senator Biden's bill relied heavily on the procedural
recommendations of the Brookings task force. 3" Although both the
24. See Biden, supra note 12, at 5.
25. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 71 (Sen. Hatch stated that the Civil Justice
Reform Act, as originally introduced, was "the product, in large part, of a task force on
which not a single sitting Federal district court judge was a member"); McManamon,
supra note 12, at 360-61; Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 389 n.42;
Robel, supra note 12, at 117. But see Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii (referring to
current federal judges assisting members of the taskforce).
26. The task-force held six meetings between September 1988 and June 1989. See S.
Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 13; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 9.
27. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 8-39.
28. See id at 8-29.
29. See id. at 30-33.
30. See id at 34-39.
31. The Brookings task force made twelve recommendations for procedural reform.
four recommendations concerning judicial resources, and provided a general discussion
of steps that clients and attorneys might take to reduce litigation costs and delay. See
supra notes 28-30.
32. Justice for All, supra note 18, at viii, 9.
33. See S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 517 (1990) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings]. On January 25, 1990, Senators Biden, Heflin, Kohl, Metzenbaum, Si-
mon, Specter, and Thurmond introduced S. 2027 in the Senate. See S. Rep. No. 416,
supra note 20, at 3. Congressmen Brooks, Fish, Kastenmeier, and Moorhead introduced
a companion bill in the House of Representatives as H.R. 3898. See H.R. 3898, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 19, at 51.
34. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 13 ("The genesis for many of the ideas
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House of Representatives and the Senate made amendments to the CJRA
before adopting it, the CJRA never shifted its focus from the reduction of
cost and delay in the federal courts."
The first recommendation of the Brookings task force called for a stat-
ute requiring each district court to develop and adopt a formal plan to
reduce cost and delay in civil litigation.36 Similarly, at the heart of the
CJRA lies the requirement that each district court implement a "civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan" 37 ("Plan") by December 1,
1993.38 The stated purpose of this requirement is "to facilitate deliberate
embraced within [the CJRA] is the report . . . 'Justice For All[:] Reducing Costs and
Delays in Civil Litigation' "); see also infra notes 36, 38, 39, 41, 60 and accompanying
text.
35. Between January and May of 1990, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary re-
ceived comments and objections on S. 2027 from lawyers, judges, and bar associations.
See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 4. On March 6, 1990, the Senate held hearings on
S. 2027. See id. As a result of the comments and hearings, on May 17, 1990, Senators
Biden and Thurmond introduced the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, S. 2648, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 548. See S. Rep.
No. 416, supra note 20, at 3-4. Title I of S. 2648 constituted a revised Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990. See id. at 4. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings
on S. 2648 on June 26, 1990. See id. On July 12, 1990, the Senate Committee approved
an amendment in the nature of a substitute for S. 2648 and reported favorably on S. 2648.
See id. at 35. On September 6, 1990, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice held hearings on H.R.
3898 and the changes made in the CJRA by the Senate Judiciary Committee through S.
2648. See H. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 8. On September 14, 1990, the House
Subcommittee reported favorably on an amendment to H.R. 3898 in the nature of a sub-
stitute, and the full Committee on the Judiciary of the House reported favorably on the
amended H.R. 3898 on September 18, 1990. See id. at 9. By voice vote, the House of
Representatives approved H.R. 3898, as amended, on September 27, 1990. See 136 Cong.
Rec. H8266 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990); 46 Cong. Q. Almanac 523 (1990). On October 27,
1990, the Senate agreed by voice vote on a compromise to H.R. 3898 (as passed by the
House of Representatives) in the form of an amendment to S. 2648 offered by Senators
Biden and Thurmond. See 136 Cong. Rec. S17,904 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). S. 2648, as
passed, was then consolidated with a number of other titles and inserted as the amended
text of H.R. 5316 which was passed again and sent to the House. The House then cleared
H.R. 5316 by voice vote shortly after midnight on October 28, 1990. See 136 Cong. Rec.
H13,297, H13,316 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990); 46 Cong. Q. Almanac 523 (1990).
36. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 12.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). Each district court may develop its own plan or
adopt a model plan which the Act requires the Judicial Conference of the United States
to develop. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 477 (Supp. IV 1992).
38. See § 103(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 5096. The Brookings report had recommended that
all district courts implement "Civil Justice Reform Plans" within one year. See Justice
for All, supra note 18, at 12. Consistent with that recommendation, the CJRA provided
that any district court which developed and implemented its Plan no earlier than June 30,
1991 and no later than December 31, 1991 should be designated by the Judicial Confer-
ence as an Early Implementation District Court. See § 103(c), 104 Stat. at 5096. The
Act encouraged Early Implementation Districts by making them eligible for additional
resources to implement their Plans. See id. In addition to the Pilot and Demonstration
districts identified infra notes 73-74, 20 other district courts qualified as Early Implemen-
tation Districts. See Civil Justice Reform Act Report: Development and Implementa-
tion of Early Implementation Districts and Pilot Courts 2 (1992) [hereinafter Civil
Justice Reform Act Report]. For an evaluation of the work of the Early Implementation
Districts, see Tobias, Recalibrating, supra note 12.
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adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve liti-
gation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions
of civil disputes."3 9 Despite this broadly stated purpose, the Act concen-
trates on only two of the announced goals-the reduction of cost and
delay. 40
The initial development of each court's Plan rests primarily with an
advisory group which the Act requires the chief judge of each district
court to appoint.41 Congress intended the advisory groups to be the pri-
mary instigators of court reform.42 Under the CJRA, the advisory
groups should consist of "attorneys and other persons who are represen-
tative of major categories of litigants in such court.143 Congress adopted
the advisory group mechanism based on the belief that reform that pro-
ceeds from the "bottom up," i.e., from the users of the system, would
more likely be successful in identifying the needs of a district and ensur-
ing compliance with any reforms proposed by the group." The drafters
of the Act also hoped that the advisory groups would "stimulate...
dialogue between the bench, the bar and [clients] about methods for
streamlining litigation practice." 5
39. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). The Brookings report identified the purpose of
such Plans as the streamlining of discovery, the improvement of judicial case manage-
ment, and renewed commitment to the "'just, speedy and inexpensive' resolution of civil
disputes." Justice for All, supra note 18, at 12.
40. The focus of the Act on cost and delay and not more broadly on a definition of
"justice" has concerned some commentators. See Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform, supra
note 12, at 199; Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 438-39. But see 136
Cong. Rec. 599 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden introducing S. 2027) ("[A]doption
of time standards does not mean that speed will have somehow displaced justice as the
primary judicial goal in the adjudication of cases.").
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 478 (Supp. IV 1992). The Brookings report also suggested simi-
lar planning groups to develop civil justice reform plans. See Justice for All, supra note
18, at 11-12.
42. See, eg., Biden, supra note 12, at 8 (characterizing the advisory groups as the
"engine for reform").
43. 28 U.S.C. § 478(b) (Supp. IV 1992). With the exception of the United States
Attorney for the district, no member of an advisory group may serve longer than four
years. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 478(c), (d) (Supp. IV 1992). For a discussion of the "balance" of
the advisory groups as actually constituted, see Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure:
The Turn to Localism in Civil Justice Reform, Brook. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1993). The
use of advisory groups has been criticized as elitist and undemocratic. See Mullenix,
Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 407; Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkan-
ization, supra note 12, at 1404-05.
44. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 14, 15; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at
10. Building reform from the "bottom up" was identified as the first of six cornerstone
principles of the CIRA. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 14. The other compo-
nents considered "essential" were: "(2) promulgating a national, statutory policy in sup-
port of judicial case management; (3) imposing greater controls on the discovery process;
(4) establishing differentiated case management systems; (5) improving motions practice
and reducing undue delays associated with decisions on motions; and (6) expanding and
enhancing the use of alternative dispute resolution." Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra
note 20, at 10-11.
45. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting Justice for All, supra note 18, at
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The CJRA instructs each advisory group to complete a "thorough as-
sessment ' 4 6 of its court for the purpose of identifying "the principal
causes of cost and delay in civil litigation"47 in the district. The Act also
directs each advisory group to provide its district court with a report
which contains recommendations of "measures, rules and programs" to
reduce such cost and delay and which describes the group's bases for its
recommendations.4" Each advisory group must base its findings and rec-
ommendations-at least in part-on assessments of several factors.
Those factors include: (1) the condition of the district court's civil and
criminal dockets;4 9 (2) trends in case filings and in demands placed on
court resources;50 (3) court procedures and the ways in which litigants
and their attorneys conduct litigation;51 and (4) the impact of new legis-
lation on the courts.52 In developing its report, an advisory group also
must "take into account the particular needs and circumstances" of its
own district.53
The CJRA permits the judges of a district court to exercise considera-
ble discretion in choosing the specific contents of the court's Plan.54 The
Act does, however, impose practical limits on the judges' discretion.
First, the Act prohibits a court from adopting a Plan without considering
the report and recommendations of the district's advisory group concern-
ing the reduction of cost and delay in that district.55 In addition, the
CJRA requires a committee-composed of the chief judge of each dis-
trict court in a circuit and the chief judge of the court of appeals for the
circuit-to review each Plan prepared by a district court in that circuit
and to make suggestions for additional or modified provisions in the
46. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1992). See also Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
and the Balkanization, supra note 12, at 1415 (criticizing portions of § 472 as being inter-
nally inconsistent).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 472(b)(2)-(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1992).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). Commentators have criticized the Act for
this district-specific approach, claiming that it may lead to a multitude of local rules
inconsistent with the uniformity in procedure among district courts which the original
drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to achieve. See, e.g., Mullenix,
Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 380-82 (commenting on the CJRA conflict with
uniformity); Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization, supra note 12, at 1402(referring to the "balkanization" that civil justice reform promises to effect). But cf.
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Stan. L. Rev.(forthcoming July 1994) (arguing that the CJRA neither authorizes nor compels local
deviations from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
54. For example, the CJRA provides that the district court shall develop or select its
plan. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). In addition, the Act suggests that a district
court need only "consult" with its advisory group in creating its plan. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 473(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("The civil justice expense and delay re-
duction plan implemented by a district court shall be developed or selected . . . after
consideration of the recommendations of an advisory group .... ").
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Plans.56 The CJRA also provides for review of each Plan by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and it permits the Judicial Conference
to request modifications to Plans deemed insufficient.57
The CJRA also curtails the scope of judicial discretion by preventing a
district court from becoming complacent. After adoption of a Plan, the
CIRA requires repeated annual assessments by each district court, in
conjunction with its advisory group. 58 Moreover, these annual assess-
ments must be conducted "with a view to determining appropriate addi-
tional actions that may be taken by the court to reduce cost and delay in
civil litigation and to improve the litigation management practices of the
court."
59
The most significant practical restriction on judicial discretion is the
Act's requirement that advisory groups and courts contemplate adoption
of the specific methods of litigation management and cost and delay re-
duction set forth in the CJRA.6 First, the Act requires consideration of
six identified "principles and guidelines of litigation management and
cost and delay reduction."6 In addition to the principles of cost and
delay reduction, the CJRA also prescribes consideration by district
courts of six "litigation management and cost and delay reduction tech-
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(a)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 474(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1992). See also Tobias, Civil Justice Re-
form and the Balkanization, supra note 12, at 1406-11 (criticizing the oversight activities
performed to date by the Judicial Conference and the committees of chief judges).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. IV 1992).
59. Id.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. IV 1992). The methods of cost and delay reduction
found in the Act are consistent with the recommendations for procedural reform made in
the Brookings report. In addition to recommending the adoption of a "Civil Justice Re-
form Plan" by each district court, the Brookings report contained eleven recommenda-
tions for the content of such plans. The Brookings' recommendations promoted the
approaches to case management ultimately found in the CJRA, including differentiated
case management, early judicial control through the setting of firm deadlines, control and
expedition of discovery, and the efficient processing of motions. See Justice for All, supra
note 18, at 12-29.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 473(a) provides:
Content of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans
(a) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan, each United States district court, in consultation with an advisory
group appointed under section 478 of this title, shall consider and may include
the following principles and guidelines of litigation management and cost and
delay reduction:
(1) systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of
individualized and case specific management to such criteria as case complex-
ity, the amount of time reasonably needed to prepare the case for trial, and
the judicial and other resources required and available for the preparation
and disposition of the case;
(2) early and ongoing control of the pretrial process through involvement
of a judicial officer in-
(A) assessing and planning the progress of a case;
(B) setting early, firm trial dates, such that the trial is scheduled to oc-
cur within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint, unless a judi-
cial officer certifies that-
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niques" '62 in formulating their Plans. The techniques differ from the prin-
(i) the demands of the case and its complexity make such a trial date
incompatible with serving the ends of justice; or
(ii) the trial cannot reasonably be held within such time because of
the complexity of the case or the number or complexity of pending crim-
inal cases;
(C) controlling the extent of discovery and the time for completion of
discovery, and ensuring compliance with appropriate requested discovery
in a timely fashion; and
(D) setting, at the earliest practicable time, deadlines for filing motions
and a time framework for their disposition;
(3) for all cases that the court or an individual judicial officer determines
are complex and any other appropriate cases, careful and deliberate monitor-
ing through discovery-case management conference or a series of such confer-
ences at which the presiding judicial officer-
(A) explores the parties' receptivity to, and the propriety of, settlement
or proceeding with litigation;
(B) identifies or formulates the principal issues in contention and, in ap-
propriate cases, provides for the staged resolution or bifurcation of issues
for trial consistent with Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(C) prepares a discovery schedule and plan consistent with any pre-
sumptive time limits that a district court may set for the completion of
discovery and with any procedures a district court may develop to-
(i) identify and limit the volume of discovery available to avoid un-
necessary or unduly burdensome or expensive discovery; and
(ii) phase discovery in two or more stages; and
(D) sets, at the earliest practicable time, deadlines for filing motions and
a time framework for their disposition;
(4) encouragement of cost-effective discovery through voluntary exchange
of information among litigants and their attorneys and through the use of
cooperative discovery devices;
(5) conservation of judicial resources by prohibiting the consideration of
discovery motions unless accompanied by a certification that the moving
party has made a reasonable and good faith effort to reach agreement with
opposing counsel on the matters set forth in the motion; and
(6) authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolu-
tion programs that-
(A) have been designated for use in a district court; or
(B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and
summary jury trial.
Id. [hereinafter "principles of cost and delay reduction"].
62. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 473(b) of the CJRA provides:
(b) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan, each United States district court, in consultation with an advisory
group appointed under section 478 of this title, shall consider and may include
the following litigation management and cost and delay reduction techniques:
(1) a requirement that counsel for each party to a case jointly present a
discovery-case management plan for the case at the initial pretrial conference,
or explain the reasons for their failure to do so;
(2) a requirement that each party be represented at each pretrial confer-
ence by an attorney who has the authority to bind that party regarding all
matters previously identified by the court for discussion at the conference and
all reasonably related matters;
(3) a requirement that all requests for extensions of deadline for comple-
tion of discovery or for postponement of the trial be signed by the attorney
and the party making the request;
(4) a neutral evaluation program for the presentation of the legal and fac-
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ciples in that the latter constitute broad standards for case management
and the former provide examples of specific acts consistent with the
broader principles.63
The language of the CJRA does not require district courts to adopt its
principles or techniques of cost and delay reduction." Whether Con-
gress should have required each district court to adopt specific methods
of cost and delay reduction was one of the most hotly contested issues
surrounding passage of the Act.65 The Judicial Conference of the United
States consistently opposed any draft of the CJRA which would require
the courts to adopt specific methods of case management."' In fact, the
tual basis of a case to a neutral court representative selected by the court at a
non-binding conference conducted early in the litigation;
(5) a requirement that, upon notice by the court, representatives of the
parties with authority to bind them in settlement discussions be present or
available by telephone during any settlement conference; and
(6) such other features as the district court considers appropriate after
considering the recommendations of the advisory group referred to in section
472(a) of this title.
Id
63. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 53.
64. Note that §§ 473(a) & (b) of the CJRA provide that the district courts and advi-
sory groups "shall consider and may include" the principles and techniques of litigation
management and cost and delay reduction. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (a), (b) (Supp. IV 1992)
(emphasis added). See also supra notes 61-62. Although the CJRA does not require
adoption of the principles and techniques described in § 473 of the Act, advisory groups
are required to explain how their recommendations comply with § 473. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 472(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1992); see also infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (discussing
CJRA requirement that certain district courts in the Act's pilot program adopt the prin-
ciples of cost and delay reduction).
65. S. 2027, the original CJRA introduced by Senator Biden, required district courts
to include fifteen specific methods of cost and delay reduction. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra
note 20, at 53; S. 2027 § 471(b)(l)-(15), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at
529-38. To accommodate concerns raised by the Judicial Conference in response to S.
2027 and to provide district courts more flexibility in cost and delay reduction, Senator
Biden introduced a revised CJRA as Title I of S. 2648. See supra note 35. Section 473 of
S. 2648, as introduced and approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, con-
tained a "two-tiered" approach to the content of the district courts' Plans. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 33, at 554-58; S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 53. S. 2648 re-
quired courts to adopt principles of cost and delay reduction, but only directed them to
consider adoption of the techniques. See id. The principles of cost and delay reduction
set forth in § 473(a) of S. 2648 as introduced by Senator Biden are almost identical to the
principles set forth in § 473(a) of the Act. The principles of cost and delay reduction set
forth in the original S. 2648, however, included a seventh principle which ultimately gave
rise to § 476 of the CJRA as enacted. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 554-57; 28
U.S.C. § 476 (Supp. IV 1992); see also infra text accompanying notes 144-49 (discussing
§ 476 and its requirements for the reporting of cases which do not meet established time
standards). For the complete legislative history of the Act, see supra notes 33, 35.
66. See, eg., Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 212, 221 (testimony and statement of
the Honorable Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, raising objections to S. 2027); id at 348 (statement of the Honorable Rob-
ert F. Peckham, on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, objecting to the
mandatory and rigid nature of some of the provisions of Title I of S. 2648, and objecting
to Title I of S. 2648 as an "unwise legislative intrusion into procedural matters that are
properly the province of the judiciary"); see also House Hearings, supra note 19, at 416-25
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Judicial Conference attempted to preempt congressionally imposed case
management by promulgating its own "14 Point Program" for district
courts to address cost and delay in civil litigation.67 The Judicial Confer-
ence program generally supported the goals underlying the CJRA.6 s In
addition, the approaches to cost and delay reduction recommended by
the Judicial Conference were very similar to those proposed in the
CJRA.6 9 Ultimately, Congress responded to some of the objections of
the judiciary and enacted a CJRA which apparently leaves the specific
methods of cost and delay reduction to the discretion of the district
courts.70 Congress, however, held to its beliefs that legislation was neces-
sary for effective reform and that no district court should be exempt from
the CJRA's provisions.71
Because the language of the CJRA does not explicitly require district
courts to adopt the Act's principles and techniques of cost and delay
reduction, the Act appears to afford district courts broad discretion in
constructing their Plans. The Act, however, does include measures
(comments of judges and courts of the United States Courts for the Seventh Circuit ob-
jecting to requirements of H.R. 3898); Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 364-71 (state-
ment of Federal Judges Association raising objections to S. 2648); Diana Murphy, The
Concerns of Federal Judges, 74 Judicature 112, 114 (1990) (summarizing objections to S.
2027 and S. 2648 by the Federal Judges Association). But see Senate Hearings, supra, at
478 (letter from the Honorable John F. Gerry reporting support of the judges of the
United States District Court of New Jersey for S. 2648); id. at 479 (letter from the Honor-
able Dickinson R. Debevoise supporting S. 2648).
67. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 325-33 (statement of the Honorable Robert
F. Peckham on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States); see also Confer-
ence OKs Plan to Cut Court Costs, Delays, Nat'l L.J., May 21, 1990, at 5. For a discus-
sion of negotiations between Congress and the Judicial Conference concerning S. 2027
and the Judicial Conference's 14-Point Program, see S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 4-
6, 30-32.
68. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 330-31 (statement of the Honorable Robert
F. Peckham on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
69. For example, the Judicial Conference program also provided for the use of advi-
sory groups to complete the following tasks: assessments of each court's civil and crimi-
nal dockets, identification of the principal sources of cost and delay, and recommending
measures to reduce cost and delay. See House Hearings, supra note 19, at 117-20 (state-
ment by the Honorable Robert F. Peckham about Title I of S. 2648); Section by Section
Comparison of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Conference's 14
Point Plan to Address Cost and Delay in Civil Litigation (draft memorandum prepared
by Administrative Office of the United States Courts) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
70. S. 2648, which contained the second version of the CJRA introduced by Senator
Biden, had presented adoption of the techniques of cost and delay reduction as optional.
See supra notes 62, 65. In an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3898, the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives first proposed optional adoption of
the principles of cost and delay reduction. See H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 3, 13.
71. The Federal Judges Association had objected to the CJRA, because, among other
reasons, the Act did not exempt districts which were current on their civil dockets. See
House Hearings, supra note 19, at 163 (statement of Diana Murphy, President Federal
Judges Association, and Judge, U.S, District Court for the District of Minnesota). For a
discussion of objections by Congress to the Judicial Conference's "14 Point Program,"
see S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 30-32.
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which strongly encourage adoption of those principles and techniques.'
For example, the CJRA created a "pilot program" which practically en-
sures that the Act's suggested principles of cost and delay reduction will
eventually constitute the bases for case management in many district
courts.73 The CJRA directed the Judicial Conference of the United
States to designate ten district courts as pilot districts.74 The Act re-
quired the pilot districts to implement their Plans by December 31, 1991,
and to include the Act's six principles of cost and delay reduction in their
Plans75 until December 31, 1994.76
As part of the pilot program study, the Judicial Conference must pro-
vide a report to Congress by the end of 1995." 7 The report must include
an assessment of the extent to which cost and delay have been reduced as
a result of the program. In addition, the report must compare the exper-
iences of the pilot districts with the experiences of ten "comparable" dis-
tricts for which adoption of the Act's principles of cost and delay
reduction had been "discretionary." 7 Perhaps most importantly, the pi-
lot program report also must contain a recommendation as to whether
some or all of the district courts should be required to include in their
72. Even when the language in the CJRA was changed to make adoption of the Act's
principles discretionary, Congress continued to advocate adoption of the principles and
techniques of cost and delay reduction set forth in the Act. For example, the House
report for the amended H.R. 3898 provided: "section 473 identifies those components of
effective case management that the Committee has ascertained to be the most essential,
and which the Committee actively encourages the district courts to consider for inclusion
in their expense and delay reduction plans." H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 10-11.
73. Section 105, 104 Stat. at 5097. In addition to the creation of the pilot program,
the CJRA also designated five courts as "demonstration" districts. Section 104, 104 Stat.
at 5097. The demonstration districts are: the Northern District of California, the West-
ern District of Michigan, the Western District of Missouri, the Northern District of
Ohio, and the Northern District of West Virginia. See § 104(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. With
respect to the demonstration districts, the Act imposes the following requirements during
the four-year period beginning on January 1, 1991: (1) the Western District of Michigan
and the Northern District of Ohio must experiment with systems of differentiated case
management that provide for the assignment of cases to appropriate processing tracks;
and (2) the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia and
the Western District of Missouri must experiment with various methods of cost and delay
reduction, including alternative dispute resolution. See § 104(b)(l)-(2), 104 Stat. at 5097.
74. See § 105(b), 104 Stat. at 5097. The CJRA dictated that at least five of the pilot
districts should encompass metropolitan areas. See § 105(b)(2), 104 Stat. at 5097. The
ten pilot districts are: the Southern District of California, the District of Delaware, the
Northern District of Georgia, the Southern District of New York, the Western District of
Oklahoma, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, the
Southern District of Texas, the District of Utah and the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
See Civil Justice Reform Act Report, supra note 38, at 1.
75. See § 105(b)(1), 104 Stat. at 5097.
76. See § 105(b)(3), 104 Stat. at 5097.
77. See § 105(c), 104 Stat. at 5098.
78. Id. The Act specifically provides that the Judicial Conference base its comparison
on a study conducted by an independent organization with expertise in the area of federal
court management. See § 105(c)(1), 104 Stat. at 5098. The Judicial Conference has en-
listed the Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand Corporation to conduct the comparison
study. See Institute for Civil Justice, Rand, 1993 Annual Report 30 (1993).
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Plans the Act's principles of cost and delay reduction.79 If the Judicial
Conference does not recommend an expansion of the pilot program's re-
quirements, the Conference must identify "alternative, more effective
cost and delay reduction programs"8 for implementation.
Senator Biden accurately described the practical effect of the pilot pro-
gram in promoting the adoption of the Act's principles of cost and delay
reduction. In advocating passage of the CJRA to the Senate, Senator
Biden stated:
Within a set number of years, then, this legislation insures that one of
two things will occur. Either the six principles of litigation manage-
ment and cost and delay reduction that Congress has specified in this
legislation will be part of district court plans nationwide, or some other
program, that has been shown to be demonstrably better, will be in
place. One way or the other, the situation is bound to improve. 81
What conclusions can we draw from our understanding of the terms of
the CJRA and its genesis? One conclusion which seems fair is that the
explicit requirements of the Act and the approaches that it implicitly
advocates put real pressure on the district courts not only to reduce de-
lay, but to reduce it sufficiently to satisfy Congress. The legislative his-
tory of the Act suggests that Congress will not hesitate to use its powers
to control court activity when it believes the courts have failed to use
their powers effectively.8 2
To meet the goals of the CJRA, district courts should understand
what Congress meant by the term "delay." The processing of civil dis-
79. See § 105(c)(2)(A), 104 Stat. at 5098.
80. Section 105(c)(2)(C), 104 Stat. at 5098. The CJRA also includes additional provi-
sions which foster adoption of its principles of litigation management. For example, the
Act permits the Judicial Conference to develop one or more model Plans, based upon
Plans developed and implemented by Early Implementation District Courts and provided
that the model plans comply with the requirements of § 473. See 28 U.S.C. § 477(a)(i)
(Supp. IV 1992). Accordingly, the CJRA requires any model plan to be based, at least in
part, on Plans which the CJRA required to adopt the principles of cost and delay reduc-
tion. Furthermore, if an advisory group recommends that a district court develop its own
Plan rather than adopt a model plan, the CJRA directs the group to explain the manner
in which the recommended plan complied with the section of the Act setting forth the
principles of cost and delay reduction. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1992); see
also S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 51-52; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 12.
Consequently, the CJRA's directions for development of the model plans and non-model
plans reinforces adherence to the Act's principles of case management.
81. 136 Cong. Rec. S17,575. (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
82. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 310. The legislative history indicates that
Congress pursued judicial reform on its own through the CJRA because of a perception
that the courts could not effectively use their powers under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to reduce cost and delay. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 8; see also
Robert Banks, The Need for Reform, 74 Judicature 113, 115 (1990) (reporting as a mem-
ber of the Brookings task force: "While eschewing a threatening tone, [Senator Biden]
advised us [at our initial gathering] that the noise level was rising in the constituency he
served. If we did not move forward with reform, he counseled, the populace would de-
mand change and change in such an environment would not necessarily produce the
positive results that were desired.").
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putes in district courts must take some time, 3 but when does the amount
of time rise to the level of "delay" which should be eliminated? In Part
II below, I will discuss what courts might perceive delay to mean in the
context of procedural reform, and what effects such understandings may
have on our system of procedural justice.
II. THE MEANING OF DELAY AND THE SCOPE OF ACCEPTABLE
DELAY REDUCTION
Just as concern with "justice delayed" is part of our heritage, uncer-
tainty about the meaning of delay and its reduction also seems to be part
of the reform tradition. 4 As Professor Leo Levin observed more than
thirty years ago, "We have, throughout the country, achieved virtual
unanimity in condemning 'delay' without even approaching agreement
on 'what delay really is.' "85
References to different senses and measurements of delay have contrib-
uted, in part, to the realm of uncertainty about delay. For example,
Maurice Rosenberg described a distinction between "court-system" de-
lay and "lawyer-caused" delay.8 6 The former sense referred to the "wait-
ing time exacted of litigants who are ready and eager to go ahead when
the court is not because other cases have priority," and the latter in-
cluded "the delay which the lawyers create through their own unreadi-
ness or unwillingness to proceed."8 7 Students of the "delay problem"8 8
also have held different views about what should be measured when con-
sidering delay; that is to say, from what point in the litigation process
delay should be assessed. 9 Commentators who viewed a judge's role pri-
marily as a passive trier of cases suggested measuring for delay only from
the time the parties present a case as ready for trial until a judge and a
courtroom are available.9" On the other hand, supporters of delay reduc-
tion who suggested the courts assume a broader responsibility for the
83. See Luskin, supra note 14, at 116 ("Most would agree... that some time used in
processing cases is normal, acceptable and even desirable."); Harry D. Nims, The Law's
Delay: The Bar's Most Urgent Problem, 44 A.B.A. J. 27 (1958) ("Of course litigation
cannot be disposed of immediately after it is started. Some lapse of time is essential and
inevitable.").
84. See, eg., Levin & Woolley, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the confusion among
lawyers, judges and lay persons as to what "delay" actually means).
85. Id. (quoting Nims, supra note 83). But cf Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 32 ("Eve-
ryone understands in a general way what is meant by delay in reference to the court
process: the period of waiting litigants must endure as they take their place in a long
queue inching its way toward judgment.").
86. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 32.
87. Id. Rosenberg dismissed "clients' delay" as a major factor in slowing justice.
because of a lack of evidence to support such a theory. Id. at 35.
88. Id at 34.
89. See id. at 33-34.
90. See Levin & Woolley, supra note 8, at 6; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 33; see also
Sipes, supra note 16, at 311 (discussing trends in the level of court control of case man-
agement); Hans Zeisel et al., Foreword to Delay in the Court, at v (2d ed., Greenwood
Press 1978) (1959) ("To measure the delay, it is necessary to determine the average inter-
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development of litigation proposed measurement of delay from either the
date of filing or the date the case is "at issue" until the date of
disposition.91
Proponents of delay reduction have directed recent efforts, such as the
CJRA, at all types of delay which might occur at any point in the civil
litigation process. For example, included in the CJRA are findings that
"[t]he courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and
the executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil liti-
gation,"92 and that solutions to problems of delay must include signifi-
cant contributions from all of those factions.93 In addition, it is clear
that the CJRA considers delay in civil litigation to be more than just a
problem of parties who are ready for trial and waiting for an available
judge or courtroom. The Act seeks to reduce delay through the early
involvement of judicial officers in planning the progress of the entire case,
controlling discovery, and regulating pretrial motion practice.94
Although the CJRA gives each district court the task of reducing de-
lay throughout the litigation process, it neither describes the circum-
stances it proscribes nor does it furnish standards for assessing the
success or failure of court efforts. In short, the Act implies that there are
unsatisfactory states of case processing, but it does little to advise courts
how to recognize satisfactory states. As suggested by one district court
judge who supported the Act, not much time was spent identifying the
problem. 95 It appears Congress assumed a common understanding of the
term "delay" and then concentrated on solutions to the problem it as-
sumed existed.96
It is not unusual for studies of the civil justice system to recognize a
problem of delay while implying that it is not necessary or useful to de-
val between the time the parties are ready for trial (or are judged to be so) and the time
the court provides trial.").
91. See Levin & Woolley, supra note 8, at 6; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 33; see also
Luskin, supra note 14, at 117 (noting that the diversity of approaches in developing an
operational definition of delay have included such diverse phenomena as number of pend-
ing cases, ratio of current cases to terminations, time lapse between processing stages,
median case processing time, and percentage of "overage" cases on the docket). Recent
empirical studies which examine the "pace" of litigation typically measure the time it
takes to proceed from the filing of the complaint to final case disposition in the trial court.
See, e.g., John A. Goerdt, Reexamining the Pace of Litigation in 39 Urban Trial Courts
36 (1991) (stating that the "pace" of civil litigation is typically measured by median time
from filing to disposition). For the difference between "pace" and "delay," see infra note
115.
92. Section 102, 104 Stat. at 5089.
93. See id.
94. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. IV 1992).
95. See Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 227. (Judge Richard A. Enslen of the West-
ern District of Michigan stated, "The task force didn't spend much time identifying the
problem. We all know what the problem is. They spent time looking for what might be
called innovative solutions.").
96. For a discussion of the assumption by Congress of a common public perception of
delay in the courts, see infra text accompanying notes 159-212.
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fine delay. 97 As one study of the system presented the issue:
Can we even define what we mean by "delay"-a term implying that
there is a known or knowable optimal pace? Indeed, is it really impor-
tant to define it, or is it better simply to measure the actual pace of
litigation and identify the principal factors that account for it, leaving
it for each citizen to judge whether the pace is satisfactory in the light
of his or her own values?98
The assumption of a shared perception of acceptable delay reduction
and the absence of a discussion of the meaning of delay in reform efforts
such as the CIRA is significant, however. If a common understanding
does not exist, then the definitional vacuum permits each district court to
develop and implement its own sense of delay reduction. More impor-
tantly, reform efforts such as the CJRA may prompt district courts to
develop their understanding of delay in light of the values they perceive
the CJRA to promote.
Where, then, might courts charged with delay reduction seek guide-
posts to direct an understanding of their task? I will consider three possi-
ble sources to which one might commonly turn in an attempt to
comprehend the objective of delay reduction. First, I will examine the
language used by proponents of delay reduction-and the CJRA in par-
ticular-in discussing the aims of their reforms.99 Second, I will investi-
gate specific standards previously established for case processing
times."° ° Finally, I will discuss some of the circumstances which lead
proponents of delay reduction to assume that delay exists and should be
reduced. 101
97. See, eg., Church, supra note 8, at ix n.l ("[W]e employ the term in its vague but
commonly understood usage: delay connotes excessive processing time, but an explicit
standard of excessiveness is not prescribed."); Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Public
Attitudes Toward the Civil Justice System and Tort Law Reform 20 (1987) [hereinafter
Harris/Aetna] (polling 2,000 adult Americans as to whether the civil justice system re-
solves disputes without "delay," but not defining the term); Barry Mahoney, Changing
Times in Trial Courts: Caseflow Management and Delay Reduction in Urban Trial
Courts 4 (1988) (noting the difficulty in obtaining agreement on what precisely consti-
tutes "acceptable delay" but also noting agreement that delay is a problem); Zeisel et al.,
supra note 90, at 43 ("Everyone has a rough common sense notion of what court delay
means and everyone realizes that delay results from a backlog of pending suits which
forces the litigants to stand in line and wait their turn."); Louis Harris & Associates, Inc.,
Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who
Spend At Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 731, 734-37(1989) [hereinafter Judges' Opinions] (polling 200 federal judges and 800 state judges on
the "causes of delays in litigation" without defining the term); Sipes, supra note 16, at 299
n.2 (noting that there is no generally accepted definition of court delay, and that the lack
of a definition should not preclude consideration of the problem).
98. Adler et al., supra note 8, at iii.
99. See infra part II.A.
100. See infra part II.B.
101. See infra part II.C.
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A. The Delay Reform Lexicon
The proponents of civil justice reform and delay reduction have used a
number of terms and phrases to suggest goals and problems with respect
to the amount of time courts take to process civil litigation. 102 The Act
and its legislative history 1 3 provide an abundant sample of the delay re-
duction vocabulary. In addition to the term "delay," the Act includes
references to the following: "timely judicial relief,""' "speedy... reso-
lution of civil disputes,"1 °5 "the amount of time reasonably needed,"',0 6
and "expediting the resolution of civil litigation." 107 And, in the various
components of the legislative history, promoters of the Act describe its
targets with phrases such as: "unnecessary cost and delay,"10 "long de-
lays,"109 "minimal level of efficiency and economy,""' "deliberate
and prompt disposition and adjudication of cases,""' "too much
102. Sir Peter Benson Maxwell noted more than one hundred years ago that differing
phrases might be used to express the same object or intention of government efforts. See
Sir Peter B. Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes 288 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1991) (1875).
103. I use the term "legislative history" here to include the Brookings report on which
the original proponents of the CJRA heavily relied. See supra text accompanying notes
18-35.
104. Section 102, 104 Stat. at 5089. See also Justice for All, supra note 18, at 5
("timely and proper judicial relief").
105. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). For examples of such terms used outside of the
CJRA and its legislative history, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ("just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"); Thomas Church, Jr., Justice Delayed: The Pace of Liti-
gation in Urban Trial Courts 1-2 (1978) (research grounded on assumption that speedy
resolution of cases is an important social goal).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). For an example of such terms used
outside of the CJRA and its legislative history, see American Bar Association National
Conference of State Trial Judges, Standards Relating to Court Delay Reduction 5 (1985)
[hereinafter 1984 Standards] ("[A]ny elapsed time other than reasonably required for
pleadings, discovery and court events, is unacceptable and should be eliminated.");
Goerdt, supra note 91, at 36 (referring to "delay" as any time beyond that which is
reasonable for obtaining a just resolution of a specific case).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 480 (Supp. IV 1992). For an example of such terms used outside of
the CJRA and its legislative history, see American Bar Association, Action Commission
to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay: Final Report,
at vii (1984) [hereinafter Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay] (referring to the study's
method of selecting three models for expediting litigation).
108. H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 8; Justice for All, supra note 18, at 23; see
also 136 Cong. Rec. 604 (1990); American Bar Association Judicial Administration Divi-
sion, Standards of Judicial Administration Volume II: Standards Relating to Trial
Courts 77 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Standards] ("[D]elay is declared to be any elapsed
time beyond that necessary to prepare and conclude a particular case.").
109. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 1; see also id. at 26 (referring to "unreasonably
long" timeframes); Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii ("cases take too long"). For an
example of such terms used outside of the CJRA and its legislative history, see Attacking
Litigation Costs and Delay, supra note 107, at 1 (describing the obtaining of justice as
taking "too long").
110. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 2.
111. Id. at 6; see also id. at 26 ("[p]rompt and timely decisions"); 136 Cong. Rec. 603
(1990) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("[T]he legislation will help ensure that disputes are
resolved fairly, promptly and inexpensively"); Justice for All, supra note 18, at 18
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time,"" 2 "excessive delay," '13 "undue delay,"' 14 "faster rates of disposi-
tion,""' 5 "as quickly... as possible,""' 6 and "delays that contribute to
those costs.""1
7
What guidance can such a delay dialect provide for courts with the
responsibility of delay reduction? Words such as "expedite," "prompt,"
"quickly," and "speedy" seem to be only antonyms of delay."" Encour-
aging delay reduction also could be presented as encouraging expedi-
tiousness, promptness, quickness, or speed. Whether the approach
chosen promotes the reduction of a suggested negative state or the in-
("prompt and well-focused case development") (quoting Wayne D. Brazil, Improving Ju-
dicial Controls Over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions: Model Rules for Case Man-
agement and Sanctions, 1981 Am B. Found. Res. J. 875, 917).
112. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 8 (quoting Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fair-
ness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985)); Justice for
All, supra note 18, at 1 (quoting Jon 0. Newman, supra); cf. American Bar Association
Division for Judicial Services, Lawyers Conference Task Force on Reduction of Litiga-
tion Cost and Delay, Defeating Delay: Developing and Implementing a Court Delay
Reduction Program 15 (1986) [hereinafter Defeating Delay] (defining delay as the
"amount of processing time that exceeds the tolerable waiting period.").
113. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 8 (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. 603 (1990) (state-
ment of Sen. Biden)); see H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 8; 136 Cong. Rec. 596
(1990) (statement of Sen. Biden referring to "excessive delays"); Justice for All, supra
note 18, at 3.
114. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 14, 26.
115. Id. at 16; see id at 19 (referring to empirical data suggesting "faster case process-
ig times" in courts which set early, firm trial dates); see also Justice for All, supra note
18, at viii (reference to "speed up discovery"); it at 2 ("resolve... disputes ... more
quickly and inexpensively"). During the last fifteen years, a number of studies ostensibly
directed at delay reduction primarily concerned the characteristics of courts with a
"faster" pace of litigation. See, eg., Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, supra note
107, at 7-22 (describing field experiments with judicial case management to reduce overall
case processing time); Church, supra note 105, at 3 (describing an empirical study with
the goal of formulating a general theory of the determinants of the pretrial pace of civil
and of criminal litigation); John Goerdt, Examining Court Delay: The Pace of Litigation
in 26 Urban Trial Courts, 1987, at 3-5 (1989) (empirical study of trial courts to examine
pace of litigation). John Goerdt has distinguished "pace" and "delay." Goerdt defines
"pace" as "the time it takes to proceed from the filing of a complaint to the issuance of a
verdict or judgment." "Delay" is defined as "any time beyond that which is reasonable
for obtaining a just resolution of a case." Goerdt, supra note 91, at 36.
116. Justice for All, supra note 18, at 6; see also id at 1 I ("move cases along quickly to
disposition").
117. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 1, 20; see Justice for All, supra note 18, at 35
(referring to the profession's need to lower the "costs of litigation, in money and in
time"). The legislative history does identify the type of costs with which Congress was
concerned as "[1]itigation transaction costs-defined as the total costs incurred by all
parties to civil litigation, excluding any ultimate liability or settlement." S. Rep. No. 416,
supra note 20, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 9. A credible argument can be
made that such phrases and other portions of the Act's legislative history suggest that
Congress was concerned primarily with reducing the cost of district court litigation, and
Congress proposed the reduction of delay only as a method of reducing cost. See infra
text accompanying notes 181-185 (discussing the cost focus of survey conducted by Louis
Harris & Associates, Inc. for the Foundation for Change).
118. See Roget's International Thesaurus § 131.15 (4th ed. 1977) (identifying




crease of the opposite positive state, the amount of direction provided is
the same. One is still left questioning what is "fast enough" or what is
"too slow."
In addition, the language of the delay reformers may complicate the
issue of delay reduction rather than clarify it. Words used to qualify
delay, such as "excessive," "long," "unnecessary," and "undue" imply
degrees of delay. Such language suggests that the problem which delay
reduction proponents address arises from some level of delay different
than mere delay. Nevertheless, reform efforts such as the CJRA direct
the courts' efforts simply to delay reduction. Does the recognition of
categories such as "unnecessary" or "excessive" delay imply that the
simple delay reduction suggested by the Act means nothing more than
cutting case processing time, whether or not it is "unnecessary"? The
CJRA leaves that question unanswered.
Even if reform efforts such as the CJRA are directed at levels of delay
other than mere delay, the use of terms such as "economy," "efficiency,"
"excessive, .... reasonably," "timely," "undue," and "unnecessary" re-
mains troublesome. These qualifiers reflect a perception of some desired
state of case processing and suggest that there are circumstances which
only detract from or are not essential to that state. Again, however, the
language does not afford an understanding of the precise nature of the
desired state or the impediments to achieving it." 9 Instead of shepherd-
ing courts towards the implied desired state, the cloak of indeterminacy
surrounding such words invites courts to implement disparate subjective
understandings of words like "economy" and "efficiency."120 In the
words of Professor Joel Grossman, "Delay is a very subjective phenome-
non, and what might be fast and efficient for a court, or for one party,
might be a disservice to the other side."''
The lack of precision in the speech of delay reduction proponents can
be analogized to the rhetoric of "due care" in traditional negligence
119. See Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litiga-
tion, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 734, 738-42 (1987) (noting that to describe what is good as that
which is efficient does not help us to recognize the good). Professor Charles Geyh has
described § 476 of the CJRA, in particular, as being directed at "indefensible decision-
making delay" on the part of district court judges. Charles G. Geyh, Adverse Publicity as
a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclosure of Pending
Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41 Clev. St. L. Rev.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, 24, on file with the Fordham Law Review). Professor
Geyh defines indefensible decision-making delay to include delays precipitated by "non-
structural inefficiency, belligerence, indecisiveness, disability, sloth and neglect." Id. at 7-
11. Professor Geyh uses the phrase "defensible delay" to refer to decision-making delay
caused by factors "beyond the judges' control, or that may otherwise be justified as neces-
sary or appropriate." Id. at 2-3.
120. Professor Samuel Gross has noted that even if we accept "efficiency" as a measure
of the relationship between benefit and cost, we are left with the task of defining the
component parts of benefit and cost. See Gross, supra note 119, at 738-39.
121. Adler et al., supra note 8, at 58. For a discussion of positive and negative perspec-
tives on "delay," see infra text accompanying notes 247-71.
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claims under tort law."2 As one authority has noted:
When jurors deciding an issue of due care are told only that negligence
is a failure to use the care that a reasonably prudent person would use
in like circumstances, they are not given a "test" of negligence. Their
instructions may be too general to be decisive when difficult discrimi-
nations must be made. Such instructions work much more like a crude
country guidepost than like a carefully kept laboratory scale.' 23
Courts have recognized the abstract nature of the negligence standards
and the benefit of providing more exact standards.' 24 The proponents of
the CIRA and delay reduction, on the other hand, have not addressed
this difficulty.
The use by delay reduction proponents of phrases with indeterminate
meanings may not be without effect. For example, as noted above, words
such as "excessive" and "unnecessary" do convey the sense of a desired
state of affairs. The flexibility in fulfilling the tasks described by such
broad language, however, can be curtailed by language perceived as
describing the same task more precisely. This dynamic between the
broad and the more precise occurs in the language of delay reduction
employed by the proponents of the CJRA. The proponents of the CJRA
use "unnecessary delay" to describe the object of their reform, but they
also use the phrases "too much time," 2 ' "faster rates of disposition,"'126
and "as quickly as possible."' 27 The value implied by such phrases can
be captured by another phrase: "faster is better." If courts turn to the
delay reduction lexicon for direction, then, the language leads them to
understand that being faster is a value which should guide them to some
otherwise unspecified desired state. The language of the CJRA lexicon,
however, does not tell courts where to stop.
B. Predetermined, Quantitative Standards
The development of the law of negligence demonstrates that when the
law requires courts to apply broad standards of indeterminate scope such
as the standard of due care, the courts will search for explicit
122. See Clarence Morris & C. Robert Morris, Jr., Morris on Torts 44 (2d ed. 1980).
According to Morris & Morris,
[t]raditional analyses of negligence suits divide the plaintiff's case into four ele-
ments. Plaintiff may recover only if (I) the defendant was under a duty to the
plaintiff to use due care, (2) the defendant was guilty of a breach of that duty,
(3) the plaintiff has suffered damages, and (4) the breach of the duty proximately
caused those damages.
IdL
123. Id. at 49. See generally Michael Saltman, The Demise of the 'Reasonable Man':
A Cross-Cultural Study of a Legal Concept (1991) (providing an anthropological analysis
of the law's use of the reasonable person standard).
124. See generally Morris & Morris, supra note 122, at 58-79 (describing judicial ef-
forts to develop more exact standards for the jury charge).
125. Supra note 112 and accompanying text.
126. Supra note 115 and accompanying text.
127. Supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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benchmarks to identify the boundaries of their discretion. 28 For exam-
ple, courts have adopted concrete standards from criminal statutes 29
and administrative safety measures 30 to identify acts or omissions which
constitute negligence per se. Some supporters of delay reduction have
adopted a similar solution. One approach to defining the term "delay"
or understanding the appropriate scope of delay reduction has been to
develop specific quantitative standards for the processing of civil litiga-
tion, i.e., deadlines applicable to the litigation events in all civil cases.131
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Standards Relating to Trial
Courts132 provide examples of specific quantitative standards used to
gauge delay. One current ABA standard provides, in pertinent part:
2.52 Standards of Timely Disposition.
The following time standards should be adopted and compliance moni-
tored: (a) General Civil - 90% of all civil cases should be settled, tried
or otherwise concluded within 12 months of the date of case filing;
98% within 18 months of such filing; and the remainder within 24
months of such filing except for individual cases in which the court
determines exceptional circumstances exist and for which a continuing
review should occur.
133
Since 1976, the ABA has promulgated various quantitative standards to
evaluate the timeliness of civil litigation.' 34 The ABA standards include
time periods that the ABA considers to be feasible in "adequately
staffed" and "well-managed" courts. 135 The creators of such standards
recognize the need to balance concerns such as "promptly resolving legal
uncertainty, .... affording litigants adequate opportunity to reach negoti-
ated settlement and adequate time to prepare for trial," and "barring
128. See Morris & Morris, supra note 122, at 58-79.
129. See id. at 61-72.
130. See id. at 72-79.
131. See infra notes 133-54 and accompanying text.
132. See 1984 Standards, supra note 106; 1992 Standards, supra note 108; 1976 Stan-
dards, infra note 134.
133. 1992 Standards, supra note 108, at 85. The National Conference of State Trial
Judges originally developed the standard set forth in the text as adopted by the ABA. See
id. at 87. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the standard in 1984 as an amendment
to a standard adopted in 1976. See 1984 Standards, supra note 106, at 11. The ABA
standards were developed for state trial courts, but the ABA has noted that the standards
may be of significance for federal trial courts. See 1992 Standards, supra note 108, at viii.
134. In 1976, the ABA adopted a standard which provided that the trial or a hearing
on the merits for most civil cases should occur within six months of filing, unless excep-
tional circumstances such as complicated discovery required a longer interval. See Amer-
ican Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards
Relating to Trial Courts 93 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Standards].
135. 1992 Standards, supra note 108, at 88; 1976 Standards, supra note 134, at 94. See
also Comptroller General, United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Con-
gress of the United States: Better Management Can Ease Federal Civil Case Backlog 3
(1981) (due to the lack of a definition for "backlog," the study defined the term "as those
cases which had been pending in the court for one year or longer after being filed." The
study also supported its definition by noting that 57 of the 71 judges interviewed in the
study agreed that the one-year criterion was reasonable).
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delay due to neglect." '36 It is believed, however, that the use of specific
and measurable standards is necessary to achieve effective case
management. 1 3
7
Predetermined quantitative deadlines consistently have played a part
in civil justice reform and in the study of the delay issue in particular. 38
The CJRA, however, does not directly attempt to define "delay" by ref-
erence to such explicit deadlines. Nevertheless, several sections of the
Act do suggest such standards for certain litigation events. First, the
principles of litigation management and cost and delay reduction suggest
that civil litigation culminate in a trial, if necessary, no later than eight-
een months after the filing of the complaint.'39 The source of the eight-
een-month standard is not certain,"4 but it is very similar to the
quantitative standard promoted by the ABA since 1984.'"' It is clear
136. 1992 Standards, supra note 108, at 88.
137. See iL at 82, 87; 1976 Standards, supra note 134, at 87. It should be noted that
the ABA standards since 1976 have assumed that case management and control of litiga-
tion by the courts is a necessity. See id at 83; 1992 Standards, supra, at 76; 1984 Stan-
dards, supra note 106, at 5.
138. See, e.g., Commission on Trial Court Performance Standards, National Center for
State Courts, Trial Court Performance Standards, with Commentary, at vii (1990) (sug-
gesting that the ABA standards provide recognized guidelines for timely case processing);
Defeating Delay, supra note 112, at 13 ("Time standards, which are the goals of a delay
reduction program, must be adopted."); Goerdt, supra note 91, at 36 ("[T]he ABA dispo-
sition time standards provide a useful and widely accepted tool with which to determine
the degree to which courts are concluding civil cases within a reasonable time period.");
Sipes, supra note 16, at 312 (reporting that, in addition to the adoption of time standards
by the ABA and the state chief justices, 18 states had adopted time standards governing
the processing of civil cases). But see Justice for All, supra note 18, at 16, 17 (recom-
mending the setting of presumptive time standards for disposition of various court
processes, but also suggesting that each district court set its own time standards rather
than imposing nationwide standards).
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992). The original version of the CJRA,
S. 2027, recommended establishing presumptive deadlines for various dispute resolution
processes, but it did not identify specific presumptive deadlines. See § 471(b)(l)(B),
(3)(G), 5(A) of S. 2027, in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 530, 533, 534.
140. The 18-month time-frame first appeared in S. 2648, the second version of the
CJRA introduced by Senator Biden. Section 473(a)(2)(B) of S. 2648 required "setting
early, firm trial dates, such that the trial is scheduled to occur within eighteen months of
the filing of the complaint, unless a judicial officer certifies that the trial cannot reason-
ably be held within such time because of the complexity of the case or the number or
complexity of pending criminal cases." Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 554-55. Both
the Judicial Conference and the Federal Judges Association objected to this provision as
unrealistic, because of factors other than case complexity or the number of pending crimi-
nal cases which affect the appropriate time for a particular civil case to go to trial. See.
e.g., House Hearings, supra note 19, at 128 (statement by the Honorable Robert F.
Peckham); ia at 173 (statement by the Honorable Diana E. Murphy, President, Federal
Judges Association). The language in § 473(2)(b), as enacted, appeared in amended H.R.
3898. See supra note 35. It appears that the House of Representatives accommodated
concerns raised by Judge Peckham that exceptions to the 18-month requirement be per-
mitted when "the ends of justice outweigh the policy for providing for an early trial
date." House Hearings, supra note 19, at 106.
141. See supra note 133.
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that Congress intended the standard as an outside time-frame. 14 2 It
should be noted that the CJRA somewhat dilutes the impact of the spe-
cific standard by providing for some exceptions, albeit only through a
certification process of limited applicability. 143
One other section of the Act raises specific predetermined deadlines for
assessing delay. Section 476 of the CJRA provides, in part:
§ 476. Enhancement of judicial information dissemination
a) The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts shall prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, that
discloses for each judicial officer-
(1) the number of motions that have been pending for more than six
months and the name of each case in which such motion has been
pending;
(2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more
than six months and the name of each case in which such trials are
under submission; and
(3) the number and names of cases that have not been terminated
within three years after filing. 144
Although the title to section 476 implies the neutral reporting of case
processing data, section 476 developed from recommendations to reduce
delay by enhancing "judicial accountability" through reporting require-
ments. 145 Section 476 attempts to reduce delay resulting from perceived
142. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 54.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. IV 1992). The CJRA's legislative his-
tory reflects conflicting attitudes toward the exceptions to the 18-month standard. The
Senate Report to S. 2648 notes that for some districts certification may become a way of
life because of overwhelming criminal caseloads. See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at
54. On the other hand, the Act's primary sponsor, Senator Biden, stated while explaining
the CJRA on the date of its consideration and passage by the Senate: "I hope that this
exception is not abused-I hope that the exception does not swallow the rule. It is our
intention that the ends of justice provision be limited to those few cases in which setting a
trial within 18 months would indeed be incompatible with serving the ends of justice."
136 Cong. Rec. S17,575 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). For the relative weights to be accorded
various portions of a legislative history, see George A. Costello, Average Voting Members
and Other "Benign Fictions" The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor De-
bates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 Duke L.J. 39, 41-60.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (Supp. IV 1992). For thorough reviews of the development of
§ 476 and its effects, see Dessem, supra note 12; Geyh, supra note 119.
145. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 27. The Brookings task force recommended
that each district court's Plan provide for the "regular publication of pending undecided
motions and caseload progress." Id. The task force believed that such reporting mecha-
nisms were necessary to "enhance judicial accountability" and would "encourage judges
with significant backlogs in undecided motions and cases ... to move their cases along
more quickly." Id. S. 2027 included a finding that "the reduction of ... delays can be
encouraged by substantially expanding the availability of public information about
backlogs in undecided motions." S. 2027, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at
526. S. 2027 also provided that each Plan should include "[p]rocedures for the regular
publication of pending undecided motions and caseload progress for each individual
judge to enhance judicial accountability." Id., § 471(b)(13), at 538. S. 2648, as originally
introduced on May 17, 1990, provided that the district court Plans would include provi-
sions applying the following principle of cost and delay reduction:
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judicial inactivity, and seeks to remedy that delay through the pressure of
negative publicity. 146 Although section 476 does not explicitly identify
six-month and three-year delays as "excessive," they are an example of
predetermined quantitative standards which imply a more certain con-
tent for terms such as "excessive" or "undue."' 147
The use of predetermined quantitative deadlines as a gauge for the suc-
cess of civil case processing does not solve the riddle of the relationship
between case processing time and procedural justice. Even those who
have advocated the use of such standards recognize the inherent danger
[E]nhancement of the accountability of each judicial officer in a district court
through semiannual reports, available to the public, that disclose for each judi-
cial officer the number of motions that have been pending more than six
months, the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more than six
months, and the number of cases that have not been terminated within three
years of filing.
S. 2648, § 473(a)(7), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 557. An amended S.
2648, as approved and reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, contained a
§ 476 almost identical to § 476 in the CJRA as enacted. The former § 476, however,
contained the heading "Enhancement of judicial accountability through information dis-
semination," and paragraph (a) of that section began with the phrase "To enhance the
accountability of each judicial officer in a district court." See S. Rep. No. 416, supra note
20, at 41. The language in the current § 476 first appeared in the amended H.R. 3898
approved by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. See H.R. Rep.
No. 732, supra note 20, at 4-5. The House removed references to judicial accountability
from the text of § 476 apparently in response to objections from the Judicial Conference.
See Geyh, supra note 119, at 29.
146. See Geyh, supra note 119, at 23-24 ("It is this concern over adverse publicity, that
section 476 seeks to exploit, by publishing data disclosing which judges are behind in
their work, and to what extent."). See also S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 60 ("By
identifying the names of the cases, the public can better assess whether the timeframe
associated with deciding the motion, adjudicating the trial or disposing of the case was
reasonable.").
There is some evidence to support the belief that the public will perceive the informa-
tion provided in the reports under § 476 in a negative light rather than a neutral light as
the title to the section might suggest. See, e.g., Terence Dungworth & Nicholas M. Pace,
Statistical Overview of Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts 20 n.3 (1990) (noting that
since the early 1960's the Judicial Conference has considered three-year-old cases to con-
stitute a "judicial emergency"); Gordon Hunter, The Slowpoke Report: Part H, Tex.
Law., Jan. 27, 1992, at 4 (describing the CJRA as providing a "kind of speedometer
reading on judges' dockets," and identifying by judge the number of civil cases pending
longer than three years); Gordon Hunter, Judges Clog Federal Docket, Tex. Law., Nov.
18, 1991, at 21 (article concerning first reports under § 476; it is accompanied by a table
entitled "The Slowpoke Report," which identified by judge the number of motions and
bench trial rulings pending longer than six months). But see Dessem, supra note 12, at
699 (suggesting that the media has paid little attention to the reports under § 476).
147. The House Committee on the Judiciary did note that the reports promulgated
under § 476 could contain explanations from judges as to why a motion or a submitted
bench trial had remained on the docket longer than six months or a case continued longer
than three years. See H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 18. The opportunity to ex-
plain or justify dispositions beyond the six month or three year periods may seem to
diminish the argument that § 476 presents predetermined standards. However, § 476
creates specific presumptions about case processing times that even the House Judiciary
Committee referred to as the "usual period of time." Id.
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of their approach. As the ABA stated in the commentary accompanying
its standards in 1976:
The administration of a system of time standards must, however, avoid
becoming entirely mechanical. This occurs when compliance with the
time standards becomes a criterion in assessing the performance of a
court or individual judge.... The consequence is not only impairment
of the quality of justice but also loss of efficiency in that the additional
errors which can result require correction through additional reconsid-
eration, redetermination, and appellate review.148
With respect to section 476 of the CJRA, in particular, Professor Dessem
has noted that the data reported under the section "merely measure judi-
cial speed in resolving motions and cases, not whether the rights of par-
ties are protected in the process."' 49 In short, absolute time standards
may act as an opiate which pleasantly dulls our sensibilities to other cri-
teria of procedural justice.
The history of predetermined time standards and the reality of case
processing also may detract from the credibility of such standards. For
example, in 1976, justice apparently required case processing within six
months.' ° In 1984 and 1992, however, justice could make do with a
flexible standard of between twelve and eighteen months.' 5 ' Further-
more, the standards often purport to reflect normal case processing capa-
bilities.'5 2 However, empirical data strongly suggest a very different
reality for many courts. For example, in John Goerdt's study of the pace
of litigation in thirty-nine urban trial courts in 1987, no court met the
ABA standards."' Goerdt concluded that "[o]verall, the data suggest
that most courts must make considerable improvements to comply with
the ABA disposition time standards."'' 5 4
148. 1976 Standards, supra note 134, § 2.52 commentary, at 95. Similar concerns were
included in the commentary of standard 2.52 as revised in 1984 and 1992. See 1992
Standards, supra note 108, § 2.52 commentary, at 87-89; 1984 Standards, supra note 106,
§ 2.52 commentary, at 12-14.
149. Dessem, supra note 12, at 715.
150. See supra note 134.
151. See supra note 133.
152. See, e.g., 1984 Standards, supra note 106, § 2.52 commentary, at 13 ("The stan-
dards have been achieved in courts of all sizes that are adequately staffed and well man-
aged."); 1976 Standards, supra note 134, § 2.52 commentary, at 94 ("[The standards]
have proven feasible in courts that are adequately staffed and well managed.").
153. See Goerdt, supra note 91, at 36-37. Goerdt's study evaluated 36 state courts on
their performance in comparison with the ABA standards. With respect to the ABA
standard of disposing of all cases within two years of filing, Goerdt's figures showed that
11 of the 36 courts were within 10% of the standard, three courts were within 5% of the
standard, and 14 courts failed to dispose of 25% or more of their cases within the two
year standard. See id. Goerdt noted that "[t]he courts averaged 22 percent over the two-
year standard." Id. at 36. With respect to the ABA standard that no more than 10% of
cases be older than one year at disposition, only one court, which had 18% of its cases
older than one year, approached the standard. See id. at 36-37.
154. Id. at 37. See also Sipes, supra note 16, at 312-13 (reporting that enforcement of
time standards varies significantly).
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C. The Assumption of a "Delay Problem"
In interpreting and understanding the scope of reform efforts, there is
a tradition of turning for assistance to the circumstances which instigated
the reform movement.' 55 What might we glean of delay's meaning or the
acceptable scope of delay reduction if we look to the circumstances
which ignite reform efforts such as the CJRA? It is clear that the CJRA
rests on two assumptions about the status of district courts and delay.
Congress assumed that delay plagued the process of civil litigation in
district courts, and it also assumed that delay should be reduced. 56 As
the history of court reform demonstrates, the classification of delay as a
problem to be reduced or eliminated did not originate with the CJRA. "7
The proponents of the CJRA also were not the first to suggest that the
initial step in "defeating delay" is a general acceptance that delay exists
and is a problem that must and can be solved.'5 8 Given that such percep-
tions underlie efforts to reduce delay, I will examine in this part some of
the bases commonly asserted to support the assumptions of those who
struggle to reduce delay. First, I will address the alleged public outcry
against delay, and then I will examine recent empirical data relating to
the existence of delay. Finally, I will consider the commonly asserted
consequences of delay.
155. See, e.g., Maxwell, supra note 102, at 18 (noting that the meaning of a statute may
be found by the "cause and necessity of making the Act").
156. The congressional findings included in the CJRA describe the problem of delay as
a foregone conclusion. See § 102, 104 Stat. at 5089. Moreover, the implied assumption
of a delay problem has been consistent throughout the development of the Act. See, eg.,
H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 9 ("The Civil Justice Reform Act addresses the dual
problems of cost and delay in Federal civil litigation."); S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at
1 ("The Federal courts are suffering today under the scourge of two related and worsen-
ing plagues. First, the costs of civil litigation, and delays that contribute to those costs
."); id. at 6 ("The Civil Justice Reform Act addresses the dual problems of cost and
delay in Federal civil litigation."); 136 Cong. Rec. 596 (1990) (introducing S. 2027, Sena-
tor Biden referred to the "escalating costs and excessive delays that characterize so much
of the civil litigation conducted today in our Nation's Federal courts"). For criticisms of
the presumption of a delay problem, see Dayton, supra note 12, at 448-49, 490;, Mullenix,
Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 386 n.29. Professor Mullenix also has suggested
that the Act forced each district court to accept the assumption of delay. See id. at 404-
05. However, in meeting the requirements of the Act, some district courts have rejected
the delay assumption and concluded that they do not suffer from delay. See. e.g., Civil
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group Report for the District of South Dakota, reprinted in
148 F.R.D. 393, 400 (1993) (stating that "the District is not 'experiencing delay' ").
157. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Macklin Fleming, The Law's
Delay: The Dragon Slain Friday Breathes Fire Again Monday, 32 Pub. Interest 13, 16
(1973) ("In most discussion about court delay it is assumed that delay is something no-
body wants, that delay happens only through incompetence, mismanagement, or neglect,
that delay is abhorred by all sensible and rational persons.").
158. See e.g., Defeating Delay, supra note 112, at 2, 7 (referring to the necessity of
recognizing delay as a problem that can be solved). But see Adler et al., supra note 8, at
58 (Joel Grossman commenting that we should not assume "delay is bad and to be re-
duced by all available means"); Miller, supra note 8, at 403-04 (describing some of the
"beneficial effects of delay").
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1. The Public's Interest in Delay Reduction
It has been common for champions of delay reduction to present their
efforts as a response to a public outcry against delay in the courts.' 9 For
example, the Brookings report, which gave rise to the Act,'" ° refers to a
civil justice system under attack because of client beliefs that it "takes too
long to get to trial," 161 and "broad consensus within the legal community
that meaningful reforms can reduce the expenses and delay involved in
civil litigation."'' 62
Delay reformers do not always identify the particular sources of their
perceptions of public opinion.' 63 In enacting the CJRA, however, Con-
159. It has been suggested that public opinion is relevant to the reform of judicial
systems and the civil litigation system because courts must have public acceptance and
support if they are to function as effective branches of government. See Yankelovich,
Skelly and White, Inc., The Public Image of Courts: Highlights of a National Survey of
The General Public, Judges, Lawyers and Community Leaders, at i (1978) [hereinafter
Yankelovich].
160. See supra text accompanying notes 18-35.
161. Justice for All, supra note 18, at vii. In addition to public opinion, the Brookings
report also refers to a "belief, borne out by the collective experience of [the task force's]
members, that the problems of cost and delay.., are serious and in need of immediate
attention .... " Id. at 5. The legislative history is replete with anecdotes about various
individual's experiences with civil litigation in district courts, which apparently were of-
fered as examples of the delay problem. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 9, 13
(testimony of the Vice President and General Counsel of FMC Corp. concerning a case in
which the court did not render a decision until two years after trial was completed and
another case in which a judge took 10 months to decide a motion); id. at 37 (statement of
the immediate past president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America concerning
a products liability case which will take two-to-three days to try, has been pending for
four years, and has had trial rescheduled four times); House Hearings, supra note 19, at
216, 240 (statement and testimony of Director of Public Citizens Litigation Group, con-
cerning six cases handled by his office which had been pending and fully briefed for over a
year and a half before different judges in the District of Columbia); id. at 84-85 (state-
ment of Congressman Bryant concerning antitrust case which took three-four years to
resolve, because judge refused to set case for trial).
162. Justice for All, supra note 18, at 2. See also Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 31(describing a conviction that grew among judges and bar leaders that "many courts
would capsize in the flood of their work"). For similar references to public opinion, see,
e.g., Goerdt, supra note 115, at 4 ("It is also clear that the American public considers
court delay a serious national problem."); Hon. Walter E. Hoffman, Foreword to Steven
Flanders, Case Management and Court Management in United States District Courts, at
vii (1977) (noting "there is a public demand for all matters.., to be handled promptly");
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 3 (1990) (referring to the "mounting
public and professional concern with the federal courts' congestion [and] delay"); Mau-
reen Solomon & Douglas K. Somerlot, Caseflow Management in the Trial Court, at vii
(1987) ("In response to public outcry about delay and increasing costs of litigation, the
Lawyers Conference of the American Bar Association's Judicial Administration Division
created the Task Force on the Reduction of Litigation Cost and Delay."); Banks, supra
note 82, at 113 ("The citizenry is frustrated with high litigation costs and delay in our
courts."); Newman, supra note 112, at 1644 ("The common perception that the litigation
process is marred by undue delays and costs is correct").
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Advocates of delay reduction often
cite to the Yankelovich study, supra note 159. The Yankelovich study is cited to support
the claim of a public outcry against delay in the courts. See, e.g., Church, supra note 105,
at 1-2. It should be noted that the Yankelovich study sampled public opinion towards
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gress relied on two surveys conducted by Louis Harris & Associates
("Harris") as a measure of public opinion. Harris conducted one survey
in 1986 for Aetna Life & Casualty ("Harris/Aetna"),'6 4 and it conducted
a second survey in 1988 for the Foundation for Change ("Harris/Foun-
dation"). 65 Analysis of the Harris survey reports raises questions about
the nature and extent of the public's concern with delay in civil litigation.
The Harris/Aetna survey attempted to assess Americans' attitudes
concerning the civil justice system in general and tort law reform in par-
ticular. 166 Harris based its analyses on interviews with approximately
2,000 adult Americans. 67 The survey questions addressed the broad
context of "the civil justice system," 68 and it did not distinguish between
state and federal courts.' 69 With respect to delay, the Harris/Aetna sur-
vey asked respondents specifically to agree or disagree with the following,
affirmative statement: "The [civil justice] system provides timely resolu-
tions of disputes without major delays."' 70 Thirty-five percent of the re-
spondents agreed, fifty-seven percent disagreed, and nine percent were
"not sure."'171
The significance to be afforded the Harris/Aetna survey is subject to
question. Both the House and Senate reports noted that fifty-seven per-
cent of the Harris/Aetna respondents believed "that the [civil justice]
system fails to provide [for] resolution of disputes without delay."7 The
use of the survey by Congress, however, was somewhat selective. For
example, the survey also solicited opinions about the need for change in
court systems as a whole-both criminal and civil. The Yankelovich report of results
does not always distinguish between attitudes toward the criminal system and attitudes
toward the civil system. In addition, the Yankelovich study found that the public gener-
ally was unable to distinguish one court from another. See Yankelovich, supra note 159,
at 2.
164. See Harris/Aetna, supra note 97.
165. See Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., Procedural Reform of the Civil Justice Sys-
tem: A Study Conducted for the Foundation for Change, Inc. (1989) [hereinafter Har-
ris/Foundation], reprinted, in part, in Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 91-184. The
Foundation for Change commissioned the survey in connection with the activities of the
Brookings taskforce, and the Brookings report also relied upon the Harris/Foundation
survey. See Justice for All, supra note 18, at 6, 15, 18-19, 35.
166. See Harris/Aetna, supra note 97, at 1.
167. The survey conducted interviews with 2,130 adult Americans, but most of the
survey analyses are based on the results of 2,008 interviews. In addition to sampling a
substantial cross-section of adults, the survey also was designed to provide information
on three smaller groups: victims of accidents who retained lawyers, victims of accidents
who did not retain lawyers, and people who had been defendants. See id.
168. Harris defined the term "civil justice system" for survey respondents to include
"lawyers, juries, judges, laws, and procedures." Id. at 45.
169. See id app. B at 41-49.
170. Id. at 20.
171. lId Fifty-seven percent of the Harris/Aetna respondents also agreed with the
statement: "The system maintains a fair balance between the rights of the injured person
and the rights of the person sued." Id The latter finding may suggest that the perception
of delay has not created a perception of unequal treatment between parties.
172. S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at 9.
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the civil justice system. 173 The Harris/Aetna respondents were equally
divided on this issue. A total of forty-eight percent thought the system
required no change or only minor changes, and a total of forty-eight per-
cent thought the system needed fundamental changes or needed to be
rebuilt completely. 174 Harris noted that "[m]ajorities of those with the
most experience with the [civil justice] system-injured people who re-
tained lawyers (51%) and defendants in lawsuits (61%)-express[ed]
support for fundamental change." 175 However, it is not clear from the
survey results that a negative perception of the system is a function of the
level of experience with the civil justice system. With the exception of
respondents characterized as "defendants," the percentages of exper-
ienced and inexperienced respondents who expressed a negative view of
the current civil justice system are not dramatically different. 176 In addi-
tion, although the Harris/Aetna respondents criticized the civil justice
system in some respects, a substantial majority concluded that the system
enables those who suffer injuries to get adequate compensation from
those who are responsible. 177 The Harris/Aetna survey may strongly
173. See Harris/Aetna, supra note 97, at 23.
174. With respect to opinions on the need for change in the civil justice system, the
Harris/Aetna survey asked respondents to select from a series of choices the statement
that came closest to expressing the respondent's "overall view." Id. The respondents
replied as follows: "The civil justice system works well and no change is necessary" (5%
of respondents); "The civil justice system works pretty well, and only minor changes are
necessary to make it work better" (43% of respondents); "The civil justice system has
some major problems and fundamental changes are needed to make it work better" (34%
of respondents); "The civil justice system has so much wrong with it that we need to
completely rebuild it" (14% of respondents); and "Don't know" or "Don't care" (4% of
respondents). Id.
For an earlier survey of the perceived need for court reform in general, see
Yankelovich, supra note 159, at 18 (finding 56% of respondents with some state court
experience believed the state/local court system generally to be in "great need" or "mod-
erate need" of reform and 41% of the respondents with no state court experience ex-
pressed the same beliefs). See also supra note 163 (discussing limitations of the
Yankelovich survey).
175. Harris/Aetna, supra note 97, at 24. A total of 51% of those who had been injured
and retained lawyers concluded that the civil justice system needed fundamental change
or to be rebuilt completely, whereas 46% of the same category of respondents concluded
that either no change or only minor changes in the system were necessary. See id. at 23.
A total of 61% of respondents identified as having had a lawsuit brought against them
("defendants") concluded that the system needed fundamental change or to be rebuilt
completely, and 39% of the defendant category concluded that either no change or minor
changes were necessary. See id.
176. With respect to respondents who viewed the civil justice system as needing funda-
mental changes, the percentage of each category of respondent was as follows: (1) Not
injured-34%; (2) Total injured (victims of accidents)-33%; (3) Injured but did not
retain a lawyer-32%; (4) Injured and retained a lawyer-37%; (5) defendants-50%.
See id. at 23. With respect to respondents who concluded that the civil justice system
needed to be rebuilt completely, the percentages of each category were: (1) Not injured-
14%. (2) Total injured-16%, (3) Injured but did not retain a lawyer- 16%, (4)Injured
and retained a lawyer-14%, and (5) defendants-11%. See id. But see Yankelovich,
supra note 159, at iii (finding that as the actual knowledge of courts increased, an unfa-
vorable evaluation of the courts became more likely).
177. The survey asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement:
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support the conclusion that Americans want a "better version" of the
civil justice system. 7 ' However, it seems an extreme characterization of
the survey results to say that the survey demonstrates broad support for a
revolutionary program of delay reduction. 7 9
The legislative history of the CJRA also refers to the Harris/Founda-
tion survey to support the Act's goals and methods.180 The Foundation
for Change broadly commissioned Harris to survey the bench and litiga-
tion bar' to determine the "degree of consensus among the judiciary
and litigators about seemingly high federal civil litigation transaction
costs and about delays in litigating federal civil cases, and to determine
whether a consensus exists on procedural reform of the civil justice sys-
tem." ' The Harris/Foundation report noted that "[t]ransaction costs
serve as a measure of the efficiency of the civil justice system," 8 3 and the
survey focused in particular on perceptions and attitudes concerning
problems with litigation transaction costs.'8 4 Accordingly, it is not sur-
prising that the CJRA's legislative history cites most often to the Harris/
Foundation survey in the context of cost reduction. 8 5 However, propo-
nents of the CJRA also cited to the Harris/Foundation survey to support
"The system enables those who suffer injuries to get adequate compensation from those
who are responsible." 73% of the respondents agreed; 22% of the respondents disagreed;
and 6% were not sure. See Harris/Aetna, supra note 97, at 20.
178. See id at 7; see also Yankelovich, supra note 159, at 52 (reporting that 62% of the
survey participants felt it would be extremely or very helpful to have tax dollars spent on
trying to make courts handle their cases faster).
179. The Harris/Aetna survey also addressed the other primary concern of the CJRA:
the cost of civil litigation. See supra notes 35, 117 and accompanying text (discussing
cost as a focus of the CRA). With respect to cost, 71% of the respondents agreed that
the "overall cost of lawsuits is too high." Harris/Aetna, supra note 97, at 16. In addition,
49% of the respondents disagreed with the statement, "The cost to the individual of
taking legal action is reasonable." Id at 20. And, 54% of the respondents disagreed with
the statement, "The overall cost of the system to society is reasonable." Id.
180. See, eg., S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 7, 19, 21 (citing the Harris/Founda-
tion survey); Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 1-2; H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20, at
9.
181. The survey sample included 250 private litigators who represent plaintiffs, 250
private litigators who represent defendants, 100 public interest litigators who actively
pursue cases in federal courts, 300 corporate general counsel from companies among the
5,000 largest American corporations, and 147 district court judges. See Harris/Founda-
tion, supra note 165, at i.
182. Iad
183. Id at iii.
184. See id The majority of the questions used in the Harris/Foundation report ad-
dressed either "transaction costs" or "transaction costs or the delays that increase those
costs." See id app. B at 103.
185. See, eg., S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 7 (characterizing the Harris/Founda-
tion survey as "illustrat[ing] the relationship between high costs and access to the
courts"); Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 1-2 (referring to the Harris/Foundation sur-
vey in which a majority of litigators and federal judges stated that "the high cost of
litigation unreasonably impedes access to the courts"); H.R. Rep. No. 732, supra note 20,
at 9 ("The results of a 1989 Harris survey illustrate the relationship between high costs
and access to the courts ....").
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the methods of cost and delay reduction promoted by the CJRA.1 6
And, as discussed below, the Harris/Foundation survey did contain
questions specifically addressing the issue of delay.'" 7
The Harris/Foundation survey elicited attitudes toward court delay
through several means. Harris constructed the survey questionnaire to
provide the respondents with multiple chances to identify-and list in
order of priority-problems with the civil litigation system in district
courts. 18 8 The procedure for identifying problems included opportunities
to identify problems on one's own as well as select problems from lists
provided by Harris. 89
Concerns about delay first appeared in the Harris/Foundation survey
when the respondents were asked to formulate their own responses to the
question, "What is the one, most serious criticism you have of the pro-
cess of civil litigation in the Federal Courts today?"' 90 With the excep-
tion of district court judges, each category of respondents presented
criticisms which Harris characterized as "delays in reaching court, exac-
erbated by clogged dockets" more often than any other criticism. 191 It
should be noted that no single criticism was identified by a majority of
any group of respondents. When asked about their perception of any
trend in disposition delays, a majority in four of the five categories of
respondents believed that delays have increased "greatly" or "some-
186. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 416, supra note 20, at 19 (noting the Harris/Foundation
survey found strong support for scheduling early and firm trial dates); Justice for All,
supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the Brookings task force drew upon the findings of the
Harris/Foundation survey in making the task force's recommendations).
187. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
188. See Harris/Foundation, supra note 165, at 20.
189. See id.
190. Id. app. B at 1. The question set forth in the text was the second question asked
of the survey participants. See id.
191. Id. at 11. The Harris/Foundation survey reported its findings concerning the
most serious criticism as follows:
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what" in the past ten years.'92 The majorities in two of the four catego-
ries of respondents were by margins of three percent or less. 19
Table 2.0
MOST SERIOUS CRITICISM OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
FEDERAL COURTS TODAY (VOLUNTEERED)
A2. What is the one, most serious criticism you have of the process of civil litigation in
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Id Other citations included: lack of alternative methods to resolve disputes (1%), lack
of firm trial dates (1%), need for early, pretrial conferences, lack of pretrial settlements,
limited use of summary judgements, limited use of sanctions. Id. Note that Harris did
not suggest possible "most serious criticisms" when it presented this issue to survey par-
ticipants. See id app. B at 1.
192. Iad at 5. With respect to perceptions of trends in disposition delays, the Harris/
Foundation survey asked the following questions: "What about delays in disposing of
civil cases in Federal Courts? Would you say that delays have increased greatly, in-
creased somewhat, decreased somewhat, or decreased greatly in the past 10 years?" Id.
The total percentages of each category of respondents who perceived that delays had
increased "greatly" or "somewhat" were as follows: 51% of private defense litigators
("Increased greatly"-18%; "Increased somewhat"-33%); 53% of private plaintiff liti-
gators ("Increased greatly-16%; "Increased somewhat"-37%); 60% of public interest
litigators ("Increased greatly"-17%; "Increased somewhat"-43%); 62% of corporate
counsel ("Increased greatly"-21%; "Increased somewhat"-41%); and 42% of federal
judges ("Increased greatly"-7%; "Increased somewhat"-35%). Id.
193. See supra note 192. For a discussion of empirical data which demonstrates stabil-
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Again, whether the results of the Harris/Foundation survey justify a
procedural revolution directed at delay reduction is open to question.
The survey responses described above do demonstrate a bench/bar per-
ception of a delay problem. 194 Responses to other questions posed by the
Harris/Foundation survey, however, temper the strength of that percep-
tion. For example, at least eighty percent of respondents in each cate-
gory of the Harris/Foundation survey graded the civil litigation process
as working "very well" or "somewhat well," while twenty percent or less
found the system to work "not very well" or "not well at all."' 9 In
addition, when asked what change they would make in the process of
civil litigation if they could make only one change, small percentages of
respondents chose options which focused specifically on timing.' 96
We also should note that neither the Harris/Aetna survey nor the
Harris/Foundation survey directly questioned those polled about the rel-
ative importance of timeliness to their perception of a "better version" of
ity--or lack of growth-in delay in federal courts generally, see infra text accompanying
notes 217-34.
194. For an earlier survey testing the public perception of a delay problem, see
Yankelovich, supra note 159, at ii (noting that delay was seen as major problem by 10%
of the judges surveyed, 12% of the lawyers, and 36% of the public). But see supra note
163 (describing the limitations of the Yankelovich survey).
195. Harris/Foundation, supra note 165, at 6. The Harris/Foundation survey re-
ported its findings concerning the quality of the federal courts as follows:
Table 1.3
OVER-ALL ASSESSMENT OF
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS TODAY
Al. Over-all, how do you feel that the process of civil litigation works in the Federal
Courts-would you say very well, somewhat well, not very well, or not well at all?
Public
Private Interest Corporate Corporate Fed.
Bases: Defense Litigators Litigators Counsel Judges
(250) (100) (100) (300) (147)
Very well 36 30 16 12 49
Somewhat well 55 56 70 68 46
Not very well 6 10 8 14 3
Not well at all 2 4 4 6 1
Not sure 1 -2 *
* Less than 0.5%.
Id.
196. Id. at 75-77. The Harris/Foundation survey reported its findings concerning
changes most sought as follows:
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Table 18.0.1
THE "ONE CHANGE" MOST SOUGHT
Comments Relating to: Increasing Case Management Role of Judges
E12. If you could make one change in the process of civil litigation in the federal courts
today, what change would you make?
Bases:






Greater use of sanctions
Firm trial dates




Control of docket/reduce court
docket
Limit judicial involvement/
























THE "ONE CHANGE" MOST SOUGHT
Comments Relating To: Changes in Rules or Procedures
E12. If you could make one change in the process of civil litigation in the federal courts




Limit the use of discovery
Discovery reform/Modify
discovery procedures
Losing party should pay legal
fees/court fees





Equitable distribution of cases/
criminal vs. civil
Limit paperwork/documentation
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the civil justice system.1 97 For example, the survey results do not tell us
which aspects of the civil justice system the public would be willing to
sacrifice-if any-for a more timely system, if such a trade-off were nec-
essary. Nor do the surveys indicate whether the participants in the civil
justice system evaluate the system by the same criteria. The Harris/
Foundation survey, in particular, sampled only the opinions of lawyers
and judges, and even those results demonstrated substantial differences
between judges and lawyers on the state of the system.198 Accordingly,
there is a risk of overemphasizing the perceptions of delay derived from
these surveys.
At least one recent study of tort litigants ("Tort Litigants study") has
attempted to assess how strongly cost and delay affect litigants' percep-
tions of the civil justice system. 199 That study reported on tort litigants'
evaluations of their experiences in resolving their claims through trials,
court-annexed arbitration, judicial settlement conferences, and bilateral
Table 18.0.3
THE "ONE CHANGE" MOST SOUGHT
Other Changes
El2. If you could make one change in the process of civil litigation in the federal courts
today, what change would you make?
Public
Private Litigators Interest Corporate Fed.
Defense Plaintiff Litigators Counsel Judges
Bases: (250) (250) (100) (300) (147)
Improved Resources/Professionalism
Appoint more judges 15 10 14 5 5
Improve quality of judges 4 8 16 2 1
Improve quality of attorneys 3 1 1 1 3
Reduce/less frivolous/
unnecessary litigation 1 2 - 4 -
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative methods of resolving
disputes/use of magistrates/
Mediation/Arbitration 4 8 10 4 9
Greater use of summary
judgements/strengthen
summary judgement process 2 1 - I
All other mentions (1 only) 19 20 19 15 26
Not sure/Refused 3 5 7 3 8
Id.
197. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 191 and the differences reported between judges' and lawyers'
opinions as to delay and discovery abuses.
199. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants'Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Soc'y Rev. 953 (1990) [hereinafter
Tort Litigants]. The authors of the study noted that their findings may be limited to the
context of tort litigation. See id. at 980. The Tort Litigants Study also provides a useful
summary of earlier studies of the opinions of participants in dispute resolution systems,
including studies which suggest delay as a reason for litigant discontent. See id. at 953-
60.
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM A CT
settlements in lawsuits brought in three state court systems.2°° The Tort
Litigants study considered the litigants' evaluations of their experiences
from two approaches. First, the study analyzed the litigants' judgments
concerning the fairness of the procedures to which they were subject. 20
Second, the study evaluated the litigants' satisfaction with the outcome
of their individual cases.20 2
With respect to judgments of procedural fairness, the Tort Litigants
study found "no consistent relationship" between such judgments and
the objective measure of case duration.20 3 Nor did subjective measures of
delay exhibit "much relationship" with judgments of procedural fair-
ness.' 4 As the reporters of the study concluded, "It is not.., that the
delay ... of litigation do[es] not matter to [the] litigants, only that liti-
gants do not appear to base their evaluations of the litigation experience
on delay.., considerations."2 What the Tort Litigants study did find
was a consistent and strong relationship between judgments of proce-
dural fairness and perceptions of control and dignity.20 6 With respect to
satisfaction with outcomes, the Tort Litigants study found that "meas-
ures of case duration, whether objective or subjective, showed little rela-
tion to outcome satisfaction." 0 7  Moreover, as with judgments of
procedural fairness, perceptions of the dignity of the procedure and liti-
gant control over the process showed significant correlations with out-
come satisfaction.208 The reporters of the Tort Litigants study concluded
that "reduced cost and delay, however desirable in their own right, can-
not be counted on to increase litigant satisfaction and to enhance feelings
of procedural justice. '2°9
However we interpret survey results, we should keep in mind several
factors. First, surveys reflect only perceptions of a problem. Public per-
ceptions may not always correspond with realities.2 10 Second, as profes-
sional pollsters have noted, "public opinion, of course, can change quite
rapidly. ' 2 11 Third, the delay about which some of the public has ex-
200. See id at 961-64.
201. See id at 954.
202. See id.
203. Id at 968.
204. Id at 971-72.
205. Id at 972 n.27. The authors of the study did note that "litigants may view long
delays... as unfortunate, but unavoidable, features of... litigation," and thus look to
other aspects to assess fairness and satisfaction. Id.
206. See id at 972. The perception of control related both to perceptions of control
over the outcome as well as control over the litigation process. See id, The reporters of
the Tort Litigants study also found that it is possible for procedures less formal than trial
to have sufficient dignity to cause perceptions of high levels of justice. See id. at 982.
207. Id. at 974.
208. See id at 976.
209. Id at 984.
210. See, eg., Judges' Opinions, supra note 97, at 732 ("Because judges believe some-
thing to be true, it does not necessarily follow that it is true.").
211. Yankelovich, supra note 159, at i.
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pressed concern has not been defined.212
2. The Relevance of Empirical Studies
In their efforts to understand and reduce delay, advocates of delay re-
duction have not had to rely solely upon public opinion or anecdotes.
Those interested in litigation processes also can employ a substantial
number of recent empirical studies to assess their opinions and ground
their assumptions about delay.213 Analyzing the issue of delay with em-
pirical studies that utilize the methods of social science is not a recent
phenomenon. 21 '4 The scope of the more recent empirical studies, how-
ever, has been broader than the range of the earlier studies.21
The Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand Corporation ("ICJ") pro-
vided the Brookings task force with an empirical study that included an
analysis of empirical data relating to civil litigation in district courts.216
Because concern about court delay-and a fear of increasing delay-in-
spired the task force's activities, the ICJ study put particular emphasis on
the time taken to dispose of cases filed in the district courts.2 7 The ICJ
study broadly analyzed data in the following areas: (1) the caseload of
the district court system from 1950 through 1986,2"8 (2) the time from
filing to disposition for "private civil cases" during the period 1971-
212. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, supra note 107, at 1-24 (empirical
study in Kentucky using experimental procedures to reduce case processing); Church,
supra note 105 (empirical study of the determinants of the pretrial pace of litigation);
Dungworth & Pace, supra note 146 (statistical analysis of federal court delay between
1971-1986 using data from the Integrated Federal Courts Data Base); Flanders, supra
note 162 (reporting the overall results of the District Court Studies Project, designed to
help courts run more efficiently); Goerdt, supra note 91 (presenting a broad-based analy-
sis of the pace of litigation in 39 large urban trial courts); William E. Hewitt et al., Courts
That Succeed: Six Profiles of Successful Courts (1990) (profiles of six metropolitan courts
that share successful histories managing problems of delay); Barry Mahoney et al., Imple-
menting Delay Reduction and Delay Prevention Programs in Urban Trial Courts (1985)
(reporting preliminary findings from research on case processing times in 18 state trial
courts with the goal of developing knowledge to eliminate backlogs and delays); Maho-
ney, supra note 97 (study of court delay in eighteen urban trial courts); Comptroller
General, supra note 135, at 16-17 (review of nine district courts to determine actions
necessary to deal with civil case backlog in federal district courts).
214. See, e.g., Levin & Woolley, supra note 8 (reporting the investigation of court de-
lays in seven Pennsylvania counties); Zeisel et al., supra note 90 (detailing the court de-
lays in the Supreme Court of New York County (Manhattan)).
215. Barry Mahoney has noted that the earlier studies focused on a single jurisdiction,
whereas the more recent studies tend to be multi-jurisdictional. See Mahoney, supra note
97, at 8 n.4.
216. See Dungworth & Pace, supra note 146, at iii [hereinafter ICJ report] (presenting
report derived from the ICJ presentation to the Brookings taskforce). The ICJ has de-
scribed its principal purpose as "help[ing] [to] make [the civil justice system] more effi-
cient and more equitable by supplying policymakers with the results of empirical
research. The cornerstone of the ICJ's research approach is independent and objective
policy analysis." Institute for Civil Justice, supra note 78, at 13-14 (1993).
217. See Dungworth & Pace, supra note 146, at v.
218. See id. § II.
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1986,219 (3) court action prior to disposition of private civil cases during
the period from 1971-1986,22o (4) variations in time to disposition among
district courts,2 2 1 and (5) correlations between speed of case processing
and factors such as case mix, court action taken prior to disposition, and
the number of judges in relation to the caseload.' The ICJ's review of
the district courts' caseload from 1950 to 1986 suggested that the volume
and "aggregate workload" of the criminal caseload and the U.S. civil
caseload22 3 was "significantly smaller than that imposed by private civil
suits" and was declining proportionately over time. 24 The ICJ con-
cluded, therefore, that if delay exists in district courts it should be most
manifest in the private civil caseload." Accordingly, the ICJ focused
the majority of its remaining analyses on private civil litigation. 26
To assess the general assertion that delay has become a more serious
problem in the district courts, the ICJ analyzed trends in the time period
from filing to disposition for the district courts during the years 1971
through 1986.227 The ICJ study used two methods to evaluate trends in
time to disposition. First, the ICJ theorized that if delay were increasing
over time, increases in the pending caseload disproportionate to the rate
of new filings would be expected to have occurred." 8 The ICJ study
showed that although the pending caseload has risen steadily systemwide
since the 1970's, the increases tended to be proportionate to the growth
in filings.22 9 The pending caseload analysis did not support a conclusion
219. Id. § III. The ICJ report used the term "private civil cases" to refer to cases
brought under the diversity-of-citizenship or federal-question jurisdiction of district
courts, excluding cases in which the United States was a plaintiff or defendant. See id. at
4 n.2. The report referred to cases in which the United States is a party as "U.S. civil
cases." Id
220. See id. § IV. The reason for including data analysis of court action prior to dispo-
sition when the larger concern is with court delay strikes me as less apparent than the
rationales for other areas the ICJ study addressed. The ICJ analyzed data concerning
court action prior to disposition in order to assess whether an appearance of timeliness
had been created by reducing the amount of time and effort allocated to increased
volumes of cases. See id at 26. The ICJ believed that such circumstances might give rise
to claims of a denial of justice. See id.
221. See id § V.
222. See id. § VI. The "casemix" included filing trends for U.S. civil suits and criminal
actions, as well as types of private civil cases. See id. at 47.
223. For a definition of "U.S. civil caseload," see 10 report, supra note 216, at 8-12.
224. Id at 14.
225. See id at 14-15.
226. See id. at 15. The analyses that focused on private civil litigation include those
identified supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
227. See id. at 16.
228. See id. In any system of case disposition that involves a time lapse from the filing
to the final disposition of a case, the system will have a "pending case" until the disposi-
tion is accomplished. See id. at 18. If the system permits continuous filings and continu-
ous terminations unrelated to the order of filing, as do the district courts, then the
"pending caseload" at the end of any year could be represented by the following equation:
Pending Year End = Pending at Beginning + Year's Filings - Year's Terminations.
See id. at 17.
229. See id. at 25.
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of a systemwide increase in delay during the period from 1971-1986.23 0
Additional support for the conclusion of the pending-caseload analysis
came from the ICJ's examination of specific disposition times for private
civil cases during the same period. The ICJ study found that the median
and mean disposition times for private civil cases changed little over the
period from 1971 to 1986, and appeared somewhat lower in the mid-
1980's compared to the 1970's.23 1 Because median and mean figures do
not disclose the complete range of disposition times or the distribution of
cases within the range, the ICJ study also examined disposition times in
the following "time-to-disposition" categories: terminations within one
year of filing, terminations within one to two years of filing, terminations
within two to three years of filing, and terminations three or more years
after filing.232 In comparing the percentage of private civil case termina-
tions systemwide in each of the four categories in 1971 and 1986, the ICJ
found that only "modest differences" occurred.233 Based on the analyses
described above, the ICJ report indicated that, notwithstanding some va-
riation between case types and considering district courts as a whole, the
district court system did not suffer from a problem of increasing delay.234
The ICJ's analyses also suggested, however, that the systemwide pic-
ture presented above was somewhat misleading. It did not portray the
substantial diversity that existed among individual district courts. 235 In
the words of the ICJ, "The stable systemwide figures, then, seem to be a
case of ice and fire averaging to a comfortable temperature. ' 23 6 For ex-
ample, the ICJ study found differences across districts with respect to the
230. See id.
231. See id. at 19-20, fig 3.2. System-wide, the median was 9 months in all but four of
the 16 years and only one month above or below 9 months in the other four years. See id.
at 20. The ICJ reported that the mean disposition times were higher than the medians
owing to the effect of a relatively small number of lengthy cases. See id.
232. See id. at 20 n.3.
233. In part, the ICj analysis included the following data:
Time to Disposition for All Private Suits
No. of SY1971 SY1986
Years % %
0-1 59.6 61.1
>1 but <2 22.2 23.4
>2 but <3 10.0 9.0
>3 8.1 6.7
Id. at 21, tbl. 3.1. "SY" refers to a "statistical year" employed by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts from July 1 through June 30. See id. at 2 n.6.
234. See id. at 25. An analysis of different case types by the ICJ revealed that a greater
percentage of contract, real property and tort cases got through the system in less than
one year at the end of the study period than at the beginning and opposite occurred in
civil rights suits and suits based on other statutes. See id. at 23, tbl. 3.2. The increase in
disposition times for civil rights and statutory actions, however, only made their disposi-
tion times more consistent with the disposition times of the other categories. See id.
235. See id. at 39.
236. Id. at 75.
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following: median disposition times during the period 1971-1986,2" the
proportion of cases terminated "quickly" and slowly,238 and changes in
the number of districts from 1971 to 1986 which processed cases quickly
or slowly.
239
The ICJ study also attempted to identify characteristics associated
with the differences in the speed of case processing exhibited by different
courts. To do so, the ICJ analyzed certain courts with faster, slower, and
average case processing measures24° with respect to a variety of factors
often assumed to affect case processing times. 24' The ICJ study con-
cluded, however, that none of the factors it considered "bore much of a
relationship" to the differences in case processing times of the fast, slow,
and average courts.24 2 While demonstrating that some districts might
237. The ICJ study demonstrated that the median disposition time for private civil
cases in the district court system for most of the sixteen-year period was nine months.
See id at 20. With the exception of two courts, the ICY study also found that the system
exhibited a "normal-looking distribution" around that figure, with the fastest group of
districts showing a median of five months and the slowest group a median of fourteen
months. See idL at 40, fig. 5.1 & n.4.
238. For example, in 1986, there were some courts in which more than 80% of all
private civil filings were terminated within one year and other district courts where the
percentage of such cases was below 40%. See id. at 41. Similar disparities also existed
when considering the slower end of the disposition-time spectrum. With respect to cases
taking more than three years to reach disposition, the ICI reported that some districts
had more than 20% of their cases in this category while other districts had less than 2%.
See id
239. The ICJ study found that more individual districts "quickly" terminated higher
proportions of their caseloads in 1971 than in 1986. See id. For example, the ICJ found
that in 1971 approximately 23 districts had terminated 70-80% of their cases within one
year after filing and 7 districts had done so with respect to greater than 80% of their
cases. See id. at 41-42, fig. 5.2. The number of districts in the corresponding categories
for 1986 were 12 and 2, respectively. See id The number of districts with higher per-
centages of suits older than three years had increased from 1971 to 1986. See id. at 41.
In 1971, only I district reported terminations in cases older than three years in the 15-
19% range and 26 districts had fewer than 2% of their terminations in cases older than
three years; the number of districts in the corresponding categories for 1986 were 6 and
14, respectively. See id. at 41, 43, fig. 5.3. Not only was there variation among districts
in the time-disposition measures described above, there also was change within districts
during the sixteen-year study period. See id. at 40. For example, the ICJ report noted
that the median disposition time "fell in 31 districts, rose in 50 others and remained
unchanged in the remainder." Id. Although changes occurred in the median times for
81 out of 94 districts, more than two-thirds of all districts had a median in 1986 that was
within three months of the 1971 median. See id.
240. For purposes of this analysis, the ICJ study segregated 30 district courts as fol-
lows. The "fast" group consisted of 10 district courts with the lowest and most stable
median times to disposition between 1971 and 1986. All districts within the "fast" group
had medians of 6 months or less. The "slow" group consisted of the 10 district courts
with median times to disposition of 12 months or higher, as well as the "highest time-to-
disposition stability." The 10 district courts in the "average" group had median times to
disposition of 9 months, the systemwide figure. See id. at 44.
241. See id. at x, 75-76. The ICJ study analyzed the fast, average and slow groups with
respect to the following characteristics: (1) filing trends for U.S. civil suits and criminal
actions; (2) the private civil case mix; (3) the type of court action taken prior to disposi-
tion, and (4) the number of judges in relation to the caseload. See id. at 47-73.
242. Id. at 77.
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fairly be characterized as "slow" or "fast" in comparison to one another,
the ICJ could not answer the question of why the slow were slow. 243 The
ICJ did conclude, however, that the fast districts did not become fast "at
the expense of procedure."'2 ' That is to say, one could not appropriately
infer from the ICJ study that fast courts shortchange litigants in terms of
court attention or procedural opportunities.
Generally, the recent empirical studies of civil litigation in the state
and federal systems, like the ICJ study, have focused on case processing
times and the characteristics associated with "fast" and "slow" courts. 245
More importantly, many of the empirical studies concede that because
they focus solely on speed and associated characteristics, they are not
assessments of the quality of procedural justice.246 The empirical studies
may demonstrate how to be faster or slower, but they do not clearly iden-
tify when time delays deny justice.
3. The Consequences of Delay
Why do we commonly treat delay as an "unmitigated evil,"'24v as "un-
qualifiedly bad,"21 48 and as "indisputably contrary to the best interests of
the citizenry"? 49 What turns the mere passage of time into the menace
of delay? Commonly, patrons of delay reduction offer a specific litany of
undesirable effects which flow from delay.25 0 The feared consequences of
delay include: (1) postponement of the resolution of rights and claims
243. See id.
244. Id. at 76.
245. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 213.
246. See, e.g., Church, supra note 105, at 2 (noting that a study of several trial courts
in which civil and criminal cases had not been delayed by any reasonable standard found
little subjective evidence that speedy courts were unjust in other respects, but that "objec-
tive assessment of the 'justness' of dispositions in these courts [wa]s beyond the scope of
this research"); Flanders, supra note 162, at 68 (finding little evidence to confirm tile
existence of conflict and quality, but also noting that no one on the project was qualified
to render a comprehensive evaluation of the quality of justice rendered in the courts
observed); Goerdt, supra note 91, at 69 (calling for future research to examine the rela-
tionship between the pace of litigation and the quality of justice); Mahoney, supra note
97, at 205-06 (describing goals other than delay reduction as appropriate aspects of the
"quality of justice"). But see Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, supra note 107, at 5,
12-13 (interviews with attorneys and judges who participated in an experiment designed
to reduce case processing time reflected that expedited procedures were not perceived to
affect the quality of case preparation or decisionmaking); Hewitt et al., supra note 213, at
156 (dismissing lawyer discontent with the speed of case processing in one court as a
possible reflection of personal values or the bar's lack of understanding).
247. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 31.
248. Zeisel et al., supra note 90, at xxii.
249. Sipes, supra note 16, at 299.
250. The undesirable effects of delay sometimes are described in general terms, such as
the denial of a "basic public service." See Sipes, supra note 16, at 299; Zeisel et al., supra
note 90, at xxii. I believe such broad conclusions derive from the specific problems I
identify infra text accompanying notes 250-58. For example, delay may deprive citizens
of a basic public service to the extent that it affords devalued judgments, induces unfair
settlements, or discourages use of the court system. Accordingly, I will not discuss fur-
ther such broad characterizations of the effects of delay.
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and the devaluing of judgments,25" ' (2) a reduction in the quality of judi-
cial fact-finding because of the tendency of memories to fade and the
possibility that evidence will deteriorate,2"2 (3) the creation of backlogs
which can cause "procedural short-cuts" and inadequate consideration
of cases on the merits,253 (4) the fostering of disrespect for the judicial
system which leads impatient individuals to seek alternative methods of
dispute resolution outside the judicial system,254 (5) the erosion of the
effect of law because unlawful acts are not redressed for years after the
acts,255 (6) the inducement of financially weaker parties to accept unfair
settlements, 256 (7) the fact that delay may affect litigants differently, z"
and (8) increases in litigation costs. 258
One's perception of the effects of delay seems to be a matter of perspec-
tive. Aphorism can match aphorism: "justice delayed is justice denied,"
but "haste makes waste."'2 59 For each of the alleged faults of delay iden-
tified above, one can argue either that the circumstance is not a fault or
that speed is not a certain cure. For example, the list recited above sug-
gests that delay in litigation burdens the participants unequally by post-
poning and devaluing judgments, forcing settlements on weak parties,
and simply treating parties differently. However, some time clearly is
necessary for parties to develop their claims and defenses in the process-
ing of civil litigation, so some "postponement" is an unavoidable conse-
251. See 1976 Standards, supra note 134, at 83; Defeating Delay, supra note 112, at xiii
(explaining that excessive delay in the disposition of civil cases prolongs and exacerbates
differences between people or entities).
252. See Defeating Delay, supra note 112, at xiii; Miller, supra note 8, at 405; Rosen-
berg, supra note 7, at 31 (quoting O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp.
577, 581 (N.D. Ill. 1960)); Zeisel et al., supra note 90, at xxii.
253. See 1976 Standards, supra note 134, at 83 (referring to the effect of "accumulated
delay").
254. See Miller, supra note 8, at 405; see also Zeisel et al., supra note 90, at xxii (noting
that delay in the courts "brings to the entire court system a loss of public confidence,
respect, and pride").
255. See Miller, supra note 8, at 405.
256. See Defeating Delay, supra note 112, at xiii; Miller, supra note 8, at 404; see also
Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 31 (noting that delay may force parties into unjust settle-
ments); Zeisel et al., supra note 90, at xxii (opining that delay "may cause sever hardship
to some parties").
257. See Zeisel et al., supra note 90, at xxii. In addition to some of the differences in
treatment noted specifically in the text, it is often suggested that delay favors the party
interested in maintaining the status quo, commonly the defendant. See, eg., Adler et al.,
supra note 8, at 93 (reporting the comments of C. Stephen Howard, "The defendant,
quite frankly, is almost always interested in delay."); id. at 91 ("Delay may be to a de-
fendant's advantage if there are other potential claims that have yet to be filed.").
258. For a general discussion of the link between cost and delay, see Gross, supra note
119, at 739 (describing delays as "generally add[ing] directly to the monetary costs of
litigation, and they increase the indirect and nonmonetary costs by prolonging the par-
ticipants' uncertainty and anxiety"); see also Sipes, supra note 16, at 299 (attributing to
delay "non-productive consumption of attorney time and concomitant increases in legal
fees"); supra note 117 (discussing the relationship between cost and delay in the CJRA).
259. Macklin Fleming, in discussing the issue of delay reduction, has referred to the
"Bog of Delay" and the "Precipice of Haste." Fleming, supra note 157, at 15.
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quence which speed cannot cure. 2 ° Moreover, a speedy resolution to an
adverse judgement, rendered incorrectly because of time limits on prepa-
ration and presentation, is of no value to the losing party.2 61 In addition,
financially weak parties may be unable to survive during extended litiga-
tion, but they also may not be able to afford the multiple resources neces-
sary to fully develop their case on a more compressed schedule.262 It
appears that either circumstance could lead a party to accept a settle-
ment which it considered unfair. Furthermore, it is not clear that delay
burdens parties unequally. Defendants, whom it is often assumed benefit
from delay, have repeatedly stated that delay generally does not further
their interests.263 Even if delay does affect parties differently by benefit-
ting one side, what applies to delay may apply to speed. Speed equally
may be perceived as a benefit to one side only.26
The list of delay's negative consequences also implies that delay dimin-
ishes the quality of civil litigation by affecting the quality of fact-finding
or encouraging shortcuts. Faded memories and lost evidence affect the
quality of fact-finding, but curtailing the time for investigation or discov-
ery may cause parties to miss relevant evidence which also could affect
the quality of fact-finding. 265 Delay may create "backlogs" which pro-
260. See Luskin, supra note 14, at 126.
261. See Gross, supra note 119, at 740; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 58 (noting that
expediting techniques often make sharp differences in determining who wins).
262. For example, a wealthy party may be able to conduct substantial discovery in a
short period of time by paying for multiple lawyers to conduct different aspects of the
discovery simultaneously. The discovery process itself or the results of discovery may be
used as leverage in a negotiation. A poorer party, on the other hand, may not be able to
pay for the work of more than one lawyer to develop equivalent discovery in the same
time period. See Adler et al., supra note 8, at 98-99 (prepared statements of Professor
Charles Halpern concerning the effect of fast track discovery on "poorly financed" and
"thinly staffed" public interest lawyers). But see Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 29
(statement of Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America,
endorsing the CJRA as the "best method of cleaning up our legal system . . . without
harming or reducing any citizen's right to [a] fair judicial process"); Harris/Foundation,
supra note 165, at 11 (reporting that in a poll of 100 "public interest litigators", 35%
identified "delays/too slow in reaching court" as the one, most serious criticism of civil
litigation in the federal courts).
263. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 14 (statement of Patrick Head, Vice
President and General Counsel of FMC Corporation, referring to several points which
make it "equally as advantageous for a large corporation [who are often defendants] to
proceed quickly to the merits of a case as it often is for plaintiffs"); Adler et al., supra
note 8, at 91 (reporting the comments of James A. Hourihan that defendants such as
insurance companies generally prefer to settle within a reasonable range as soon as possi-
ble to avoid attorney fees).
264. See Adler et al., supra note 8, at 99 (reporting the prepared comments of Profes-
sor Charles Halpern).
265. The argument that memories fade over time seems less persuasive given modern
methods of preserving witness testimony, such as film, photographs and video-tape.
Steven Flanders has suggested that such recorded forms of evidence do not have the same
effect at trial. See Adler et al., supra note 8, at 71 (reported discussion following prepared
comments of Joel B. Grossman). We should keep in mind, however, a fact upon which
proponents and skeptics of delay reduction agree: most cases do not go to trial.
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mote the use of "procedural shortcuts. ' 26 6 However, even the backers of
delay reduction have recognized that promoting the expedited processing
of cases to avoid backlogs also may result in truncated procedures and
proceedings which fail to address fully the merits of a case.2 61
The enumerated vices of delay also imply that delay fosters disrespect
for the law and judicial systems because it permits law breakers to post-
pone liability, leads to a public perception of incompetence, and/or dis-
courages use of the courts by increasing the costs of litigation.2 6 Faster
processes, however, will not guarantee respect. To the contrary, Maurice
Rosenberg has noted that an emphasis on speed can promote disrespect
by suggesting to parties and lawyers that courts view their cases "as
merely counters in a numbers game.",2 69 Furthermore, it has been ar-
gued that delay is good to the extent that it deters litigation and leads
disputants to seek other-perhaps more creative and more suitable-
methods of dispute resolution.270 Simply put, the resolution of disputes
without resort to traditional litigation is not recognized as inherently
evil.
Finally, all those concerned with the pace of case processing do not
share the belief that reducing delay necessarily reduces or controls costs.
In fact, fast tracks might promote additional expenditures by parties who
feel pressured to prepare their case fully before time runs out, but who
would pursue fewer measures if they had additional time for reflection
and planning.271
Because the analysis of the suggested effects of delay demonstrates that
the same time lapse may be perceived in different ways, understanding
the perceived consequences of delay does not help us discern the appro-
priate scope of delay reduction. The analysis reminds us, however, that
266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
267. See, eg., Tort Litigants, supra note 199, at 959 n.5 (describing studies which sug-
gest the importance of the perceived accuracy of procedures in uncovering and presenting
facts to litigants' evaluations of litigation); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 58 (noting that
expedited procedures may "circumvent guarantees found in constitutional or statutory
provisions").
268. For example, Senator Biden stated in the first hearing on S. 2027, "Access to the
courts, once available to everyone, has become for middle-class Americans a luxury that
only others can afford." Senate Hearings, supra note 33, at 1. And later, in the same
hearings, Senator Biden said, "[A]nd once the middle class in this country loses confi-
dence in the judicial system as a fair arbiter and one which they can call upon without
having to hock their savings to do so-unless that happens, we are going to have a prob-
lem." Id. at 3.
269. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 58.
270. See Gross, supra, note 119, at 752-53.
271. Cf Adler et al., supra note 8, at 90 (reporting the comments of James A.
Hourihan, describing why an attorney would take the same amount of discovery in a
compressed time period as in a longer time period). But see id. at 53 (reporting the
comments of Steven Flanders discussing an empirical study which suggests that faster
jurisdictions had somewhat more discovery activity than the slower jurisdictions, but the




conventional wisdom notwithstanding, the speed of case processing is not
necessarily an indicia of procedural justice.
III. A CONCLUSION: JUGGLING JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL
NATURE OF DELAY REDUCTION EFFORTS
How, then, should we view reform efforts which focus on delay reduc-
tion? The definition of delay alone, fortified by tradition, presents an
apparently formidable argument that such efforts must be encouraged
and supported. It seems irrational to argue against reforms directed at
delay reduction. Who would argue for evil? Yet an argument against
delay reduction efforts is not an argument that delay is good or an argu-
ment to deny that delay reduction efforts may produce acceptable results.
Rather, the argument against delay reduction efforts arises from the risks
to procedural justice presented by such efforts, risks of going too far and
not far enough. The argument against reform efforts which focus on de-
lay concerns the utility of speed as a gauge to measure the success of civil
litigation. The argument addresses the futility of trying to construct-or
reconstruct-justice one piece at a time.
A. The Risk of Going Too Far
Even if there is a lack of consensus as to the precise elements of proce-
dural justice, there is broad support for the idea that procedural justice
requires that some time pass in civil litigation. 72 Moreover, it is well-
accepted that allotting extreme amounts of time for civil litigation events
inhibits reaching a desired or acceptable state to which we refer-at least
in part-as procedural justice. 73 In other words, the amount of time
taken in civil litigation has some effect on the nature of the dispute and
the result of the process.
What delay reduction efforts become, however, are attempts to locate
where procedural justice lies between "too fast" and "too slow." That is
not to say that they represent procedural justice as reigning at one spe-
cific point on the time spectrum for all types of cases or parties. Rather,
reformers who emphasize the time expended in civil litigation suggest
that, whether the current state of affairs drifts more towards "too slow"
or "too fast," there is some better state of affairs.2 74 We have a tradition
of frustration in seeking to eliminate delay, 275 because the criteria of "too
fast" and "too slow" are crude instruments for assessing civil justice.276
We are trying to use instruments which remain uncalibrated due to a
272. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 247-71 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 95-127 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
276. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 57 ("A serious debit has been the loss of a sense of
proportion by many well-intentioned custodians of civil justice. Many of their cures for
delay are much worse than the disease itself.").
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lack of definition.277 Because we have not-and perhaps cannot-define
delay in practice, we resort to what we can do or what we think we are
being told to do.2 7 8 That is to say, we tend to substitute the absolute pace
of case processing as our standard for measuring civil litigation."
One response to such theoretical jargon may be "so what?" Even if
those commentators who focus on delay do lead us to correlate proce-
dural justice with the pace of case processing, their efforts cannot hurt
the state of procedural justice. If such reform efforts fall short of the
mark, they are better than nothing. If they overshoot the mark, then the
efforts of proponents from the other side of the spectrum will mitigate
the effects of the miss. Faith in a tendency towards equilibrium is justi-
fied, however, only if there exist equivalent opportunities for pressure
from both ends of the spectrum. That is not the case with the CJRA.
The terms and conditions of the CJRA enhance the risk of associating
procedural justice with the speed of case processing. The CJRA hurls
the weight of ninety-four federal district courts in one direction only. It
forces each district court, in every year through 1997, to focus on
whether civil litigation in the court is fast enough.280 No district court is
exempt from the yearly self-critique relating to speed, no matter how fast
its case processing becomes.28 ' With such incentives and no bright line
marking "fast enough," the message of the CJRA is likely to be heard
not just as "faster than now is better," but rather as "faster and faster is
better and better." Such an unguided reform effort goes too far, and the
mindset promoted by the Act may not change quickly.
B. The Risk of Not Going Far Enough
How might reform focusing on delay reduction be challenged as not
going far enough? Our tradition of delay anxiety demonstrates that tim-
ing is a secondary interest of procedural justice, not a primary con-
cern.2 2 As the discussion of the perceived consequences of delay
demonstrates, timing is of concern only because it may aid or hinder
more central concerns of procedural justice.283 The issue of the "quality
of justice" presents a much more complex competition among social val-
ues than the focus on delay can accommodate. 284 For example, concerns
relating to the "quality of justice" may include issues such as the appro-
priate allocation of government resources, protection of fundamental
277. See supra notes 84-127 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 92-127 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 132-54, 213-46 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 18-81 and accompanying text (a historical development of the
CJRA and a description of the CJRA's requirements); see also notes 84-127 and accom-
panying text (for a discussion of the indeterminate nature of "delay").
281. See supra notes 58, 59, 71, and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text. But see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (reading
as if justice, speed and lack of expense are goals of equal weight).
283. See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
284. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 57 (describing the "neglected problem" as quality
and "not the speed[ ] of the process[ ]").
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rights, equitable distribution of wealth and power, maintenance of public
order, and promotion of human dignity.28 5 Efforts that target delay re-
duction obfuscate more important issues of procedural justice. Such ef-
forts lead us to engage in activities which only appear to improve the civil
justice system but which may have no causal relationship to other con-
cerns covered by the broad phrase "procedural justice. ' 2 6 In short, the
absence of delay does not ensure the quality of justice.
Finally, reform efforts so dramatically focused on delay reduction may
constrict the range of voices which will be heard in the process of defin-
ing procedural justice. It is far from clear that delay is of equal concern
to all who have an interest in the civil justice system.2" 7 By making delay
reduction of primary importance, we may muffle the voices and concerns
of constituencies who would emphasize other elements of justice.288
The traditional icon of justice has been a woman wearing a blindfold
and holding scales aloft. 2 9 We may have become too comfortable in the
belief that the scales will always balance no matter how quickly we put
weights on either side. Perhaps it is time that we change our icon to that
of a juggler, one whom we ask to keep many elements of procedural jus-
tice in the air. Throwing elements quickly into the air but letting them
fall, or throwing and catching one element quickly will not satisfy us.
Our object is to juggle a multitude of values, and it is toward that end we
should focus. 290 We can always work on speed later.
285. See, e.g., Robert A. B. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil
Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 893, 908-21
(describing the goals of the civil justice processes as including: resource allocation, social
justice, fundamental rights protection, public order, human relations, legitimacy of gov-
erning institutions, and efficient administration of social enterprises); Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's
Rights, 1973 Duke L.J. 1153, 1172-77 (describing four "litigation values" as including:
"dignity values, participation values, deterrence values, and effectuation [of rights] val-
ues"); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 845-59 (identifying "valued features"
as including: for litigants, autonomy and persuasion opportunities; for decision makers,
concentration of power, diffusion and reallocation of power, impartiality and visibility,
rationality and norm enforcement, and ritual and formality; and for decisionmaking, fi-
nality, revisionism, economy, consistency, and differentiation); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
American Law Institute, Study on Paths to a "Better Way" Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation, 1989 Duke L.J. 824, 847-50 (identifying procedural values and goals as
including: fairness in treatment of litigants, accuracy in factfinding, decisions in accord
with applicable norms, and efficiency).
286. For example, the reporters of the Tort Litigants Study noted "if satisfaction and
perceived fairness are not in reality linked to cost and delay, the procedural innovations,
however effective in achieving these goals, might fail to produce improvements in per-
ceived fairness and satisfaction." Tort Litigants, supra note 199, at 957.
287. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
288. The study of pilot districts which the Institute for Civil Justice will conduct pur-
suant to the CJRA will include an assessment of the satisfaction of litigants with the new
procedures used in the pilot districts. See Institute for Civil Justice, supra note 216, at 30.
289. For an extensive discussion and analysis of representations of justice, see Dennis
E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 1727 (1987).
290. See James et al., supra note 1, § 1.1, at 2-3 (noting that the "hardest and most
important job" of a procedural system is to balance competing objectives).
